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ABSTRACT 
EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 
WITHIN THE U.S. MARINE CORPS 
Aaron B. Lang 
Old Dominion University, May 2012 
Director: John M. Ritz 
The purpose of this study was to identify potential barriers to the effective 
employment of command and control (C2) systems to enhance warfighter readiness. Five 
research hypotheses guided this study, which addressed the perception of the effective 
employment of Marine Corps C2 systems based on demographic characteristics, which 
included: organization, occupational field, experience, rank, and recent deployment 
experience. 
The population of the study included Active and Reserve Staff Non-
commissioned Officers (SNCOs) and Officers that now serve, or have recently served in 
an infantry unit within the Operating Forces, and the Marines and civilian employees 
involved in the capability development, acquisition, and training of C2 systems from 
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment. Data was collected from 
this population using a web-based survey conducted during the months of December 
2011 and January 2012. The total response rate for this study was approximately 11%, 
which consisted of 551 participants. 
The /-test was used to address Hypothesisoi and Hypothesisos, while one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to address Hypothesiso2, Hypothesises, and 
Hypothesisoi The results identified statistically significant findings in each of the five 
research hypotheses across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership 
and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct. Recommendations for 
improvement are provided to address each of the significant findings, which is followed 
by recommendations for further research as a result of this study. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Introducing new information technology (IT) within an organization requires a 
detailed strategy to ensure the new technology helps the organization, rather than hinders 
it. This becomes increasingly complex for large organizations operating in a global 
economy. In these situations, Shore (2006) suggests that budgets are often 
underestimated, technical challenges frequently arise, and resistance to change by 
employees can all have an adverse impact on successful implementation of new IT. To 
overcome these challenges, the organization must make critical decisions to ensure 
success. These decisions must be based on forecasted requirements that are often difficult 
to predict. Why change something if the old system works? Hill and Friday-Stroud 
(2009) claim that an organization's reaction to the latest and greatest technology is what 
often drives decision-making. This desire for a competitive edge is what organizations 
are seeking. As technology continues to evolve, keeping pace with the latest trends can be 
costly to develop, implement, train, and evaluate. This study will introduce Marine Corps 
training concepts, review the fundamentals of training program evaluation, provide an 
understanding of the acquisition challenges unique to the Marine Corps when purchasing 
IT, and managing associated organizational change. 
Within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), implementing new IT can present 
even greater challenges because operating areas change as conflicts occur in different 
locations around the world. When the decision is made to send U.S. troops into harm's 
way, missions vary, which influence different strategic objectives, depending on where 
the troops will be located. Conflict rarely provides a static environment, which requires 
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smart decision-making regarding what the forces will need in relation to IT. What may 
have served as the right IT solutions in a previous engagement may not provide the 
desired results in future conflicts. Additionally, the American people demand that the 
U.S. Armed Forces are best equipped with the latest technologies to provide a decisive 
advantage over the adversary. 
To overcome some of these challenges, a detailed and elaborate enterprise IT 
strategy must be developed. As IT strategies are developed, organizations must evaluate 
how they will respond to the current needs of the users. Clegg (1988) found that 
decisions are often made without considering how these changes will affect routine 
business processes. Clegg further states that "there is a lack of strategic thinking about 
IT" (p. 134). Many parameters must be evaluated to ensure decisions are made smartly 
based on several constraints. In addition to implementing a new software solution, 
decision-makers must assess a training plan. Although the next best thing may be the 
latest technological solution, it may be overly complicated, creating a significant training 
requirement. An assessment of utility must be conducted to determine other effects of 
fielding an IT solution. Strassman (2003) suggests that while it may appear to promise 
great results, the cost of implementation may outweigh the current method of doing 
business. 
Developing an enterprise IT strategy forces leadership, decision-makers, and IT 
managers to think through the lasting impacts of implementing new IT within an 
organization. Most importantly, an IT strategy evaluates life-cycle costs, which far 
surpass the initial purchase price of the technology. With any change affecting routine 
business processes, new IT can have a significant impact on how employees perform 
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their daily functions. Management must effectively communicate the change in advance, 
inform the users regarding the benefits or the new application, and ensure that they are 
aware that training and support will be provided to ease the transition. With any 
organizational change regarding IT, training design, development, and delivery must be 
addressed and exercised to assure training objectives are achieved. To determine the 
effectiveness of the associated training, organizations must implement training program 
evaluation to ensure these objectives are being met and, ultimately, determine the 
effectiveness of the new IT application (Chiara & Vincenzo, 2008). If any of these 
procedures are overlooked or marginalized, the organization is not truly thinking through 
the requirements of making a change to the legacy IT systems architecture, which may 
actually reflect a negative return on investment. 
Exercising command and control (C2) in a complex and dynamic combat 
environment provides a significant challenge to top commanders of the U.S. armed 
forces. The advent of new IT solutions, and, as a result, new C2 systems in recent years 
has made an attempt to simplify the flow of information, aiming to increase shared 
situational awareness down to the lowest level. Because many of these technologies have 
been developed within a specific warfighting function, this has resulted in a disparate 
array of multiple, independent software applications creating significant training and 
implementation challenges for the warfighter. 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study was to identify potential barriers to the effective 
employment of command and control (C2) systems to enhance warfighter readiness. 
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Hypotheses 
To guide this study, the following hypotheses were established: 
Hoi: There is no difference in the perception of the effective employment of 
Marine Corps C2 systems between the Operating Forces and Headquarters, 
Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment across the Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) 
construct. 
H02: There is no relationship between occupational field and the perception of the 
effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF 
construct. 
H03: There is no relationship between experience and the perception of the 
effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF 
construct. 
H04: There is no relationship between rank and the perception of the effective 
employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. 
H05: There is no relationship between recent deployment experience and the 
perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the 
DOTMLPF construct. 
Background and Significance 
The implementation of a new IT solution can be very costly in ways other than 
merely dollars and cents. Not only must an organization consider the purchase price, but 
they must also consider the total life-cycle costs associated with implementing, training, 
sustaining, and servicing the product. This is not only a monetary consideration, but a 
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time consideration, as well. The amount of time needed to train users on the new tool 
must be addressed prior to making a funding decision. Support services typically add to 
the total cost, but if they are not considered and the organization runs into problems it 
may impact operations. For these reasons, an organization must conduct a thorough 
analysis before making a purchase decision. Regarding the cost of IT, Benamati and 
Lederer (2005) suggested that implementing new IT: 
Can produce the need for new skills and thus unforeseen training demands. It can 
also increase staffing requirements, cause the unanticipated need to integrate old 
and new IT, and create dilemmas about which particular IT to acquire and when 
to acquire it. (p. 83) 
Acquiring new IT based on the latest technological solution being available does 
not mean that an organization should quickly implement it. Beyond the capability of the 
tool, one must consider the effects that are introduced into organizational processes when 
purchase decisions are made. Hill and Friday-Stroud (2009) claim that "many 
organizations are implementing leading technologies and creating an abundance of 
information without considering the attributes of the information (e.g., its complexity, 
level of aggregation, reliability, ambiguity, timeliness) and obstacles that may impede 
effective use of the information" (p. 2). 
Within the U.S. Marine Corps, integrating old and new systems and tools can be 
problematic. Perhaps a software engineer understands these issues, but how is that 
translated to the user? This presents significant challenges that must be addressed. After a 
decision has been made to acquire a new IT solution, the organization must develop a 
plan to implement the tool among the users. 
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Furthermore, decision-makers must evaluate utility versus the capacity of 
information that is helpful to the user. Hill and Friday-Stroud (2009) further suggested 
that "system designers and trainers should continuously be aware of the differences that 
exist in users' task constraints, information processing needs and capabilities when 
designing technological systems and user-friendly interfaces, selecting output formats, 
and designing training programs" (p. 8). It is not always the best decision to evaluate a 
new IT solution in isolation. What currently exists, and how does the proposed IT 
solution fit into the systems architecture? This kind of detailed analysis is often beyond 
the scope and capability of the individual making the purchase decision. During the 
assessment stage of determining IT requirements, an organization could gain by 
incorporating these guidelines. To truly understand the costs associated with 
implementing the appropriate training plan, a training expert must be included in the 
decision-making process. If this is overlooked, a major adjustment to the budget should 
be anticipated to correct training shortfalls. If not, an organization should expect limited 
utility from the IT solution. 
Because the complexity of IT solutions continues to increase (Shore, 2006), 
organizations have been outsourcing their IT support functions. This typically comes with 
a significant cost for services. The U.S. Armed Forces are doing this as well. Often, the 
U.S. military does not have the benefit of time to train when implementing new 
technologies. As a result, they would rather pay someone else to ensure the capability is 
available, even if uniformed personnel are not the ones providing system administration 
on the tools (Edwards, 2011). While this may be the best strategy in the short term, the 
only way to overcome this requirement in future conflicts is to train the force to operate 
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its own equipment. This is significant because contracted and/or civilian personnel will 
not always be able to accompany uniformed service members when entering a hostile 
territory. Again, training is an investment of both time and money. Commanders must 
evaluate what the training is worth to be best prepared for crisis response. 
Adopting new policy regarding IT decisions is often difficult for organizations to 
manage. Like most organizations, change to current processes usually face challenges 
until it becomes common practice. Langer (2005) found that implementing new IT often 
creates a dynamic of organizational change. The implementation of new IT not only 
requires a change in business practices, but often requires a change in implementation 
policy, as well. To best overcome these issues, organizations must become educated on 
the effects of organizational change and incorporate an organizational change 
management strategy. Following an understanding of the potential effects of 
implementing new IT, leadership can begin shaping the training required to truly benefit 
from its use. 
Limitations 
The findings of this research were limited by the following parameters: 
1. This study focused specifically on C2 systems, which is one of many forms of IT 
used within the Armed Forces consisting of both hardware and software. 
2. Research was conducted focusing only on C2 system users and those that 
develop, train, and equip the Operating Forces within the U.S. Marine Corps. 
3. This study was focused on the effective employment of C2 systems used within 
the Combat Operations Center (COC) by the infantry community. 
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Assumptions 
Assumptions of this study were: 
1. IT procurement policy would continue to evolve during the course of this study; 
2. Training requirements will continue to increase with the fielding of new IT; 
3. Marine Corps business processes can be informed through this study; 
4. Time required to train will continue to impact operational readiness, and; 
5. The population selected for this study adequately represents the views of their 
peers in the U.S. Marine Corps. 
Procedures 
To address this problem, the researcher reviewed relevant Marine Corps 
documentation pertaining to the capabilities development, acquisition, and 
implementation of new IT applications to develop a thorough understanding of the 
environment. Existing data from U.S. Marine Corps sources and published articles from 
private industry were used to assess the challenges of implementing new technologies. 
Following an initial study of documentation within the Marine Corps, research was 
conducted to find out what has been done in recent history within private industry to 
identify strategies to overcome organizational change associated with the implementation 
of new IT. 
Following an initial review of existing data, the researcher developed a survey to 
address the stated research questions. The survey incorporated closed-ended questions 
with a five-point Likert-scale. The survey was provided via a web link that was 
distributed to the sample. 
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Following data collection, statistical analysis was conducted to compare sample 
means of group responses to identify trends and patterns. Sample groups were created 
based on the respondent's organization (Headquarters, Marine Corps and Supporting 
Establishment as one group, and Marines from the Operating Forces as the other group). 
Beyond the two primary groups, demographic information was collected to determine if 
there were statistically significant differences in responses based on occupational field, 
rank, experience, and recent deployment experience (within the past three years). 
Definition of Terms 
To ensure the reader understands the study, in context, basic definitions have been 
provided that are somewhat unique to the Marine Corps and DoD culture. These terms 
are used several times throughout the study. 
After-Action Reports (AAR) can be defined as a report written and published by an 
operational unit that has recently returned from a deployment in support of an operation. 
Within the AAR, units address their challenges, recommendations for improvement, as 
well as what tactics, techniques, and procedures were used to overcome some of the 
challenges that were encountered during deployment. 
Command and Control (C2) is defined by the Department of Defense (DoD) as the 
following: the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander 
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and 
control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, 
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of 
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the mission (Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
2010). 
Combat Operations Center (COC) is the facility from which unit leadership conducts 
command and control in support of their unit and commander. 
Command and Control Systems can be defined as a form of information technology or 
information system, consisting of hardware and software, that enables the act of C2. 
Doctrine can be defined as guiding principles employed by military forces to achieve 
stated objectives. It is a guide, but is not an absolute way of conducting each operation. 
Effective Employment of C2 Systems can be defined as the ability of an individual or a 
unit to utilize C2 systems to perform their intended functions in an operational setting as 
a result of training. 
Fielding can be defined as the implementation of a new technology to the user-level. 
Information Technology can be defined as any software or hardware that enables the 
exchange of information. 
Information Systems can be defined as any software application that enables the 
exchange of information. IT and IS are used interchangeably throughout this study. 
IT Solutions can be defined as IT tools that meet the needs of the organization. 
Operating Forces can be defined as operational units of the Marine Corps. 
Headquarters, Marine Corps can be defined as the leadership entities that are 
responsible for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) within the 
Marine Corps. 
Supporting Establishment can be defined as the component of the Marine Corps that 
supports warfighter requirements in peacetime and during the time of war. 
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Users can be defined as anyone that uses an IT/IS application or C2 system. 
Warfighter can be defined as a service member operating in support of a military 
operation. 
Warfighter Readiness can be defined as the individual Marine's ability to perform 
his/her assigned duties as a result of training and preparation. 
Summary and Overview 
Deep-rooted in the doctrine of the Marine Corps, there is a statement that was 
written into a doctrinal publication regarding the adoption of technological capabilities. 
MCDP-1, Warfighting (1996) states the following: 
There are two dangers with respect to equipment: the overreliance on technology 
and the failure to make the most of technological capabilities. Technology can 
enhance the ways and means of war by improving humanity's ability to wage it, 
but technology cannot and should not attempt to eliminate humanity from the 
process of waging war. (p. 67) 
This states the root of the problem of this study. Technology should help to perform a 
function more effectively, increase a shared understanding, or simplify a process. If an 
organization is over-reliant on technology, they will likely be ineffective if the 
technology fails. To overcome this problem, organizations such as the Marine Corps must 
plan to learn and use technology, but consider how this technology helps or prohibits 
operational success. 
The challenges of implementing IT within an organization must be carefully 
considered to ensure the return on investment (ROI) is maximized. If the users are not 
properly trained on an IT solution's capabilities, and how it fits in with existing IT, the 
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ROI is likely to be low. There are several components that must be considered when 
making an IT procurement decision. The purpose of this study was to identify potential 
barriers to the effective employment of C2 systems. Through this study, the researcher 
was able to identify potential barriers to the effective employment of C2 systems as 
perceived by Marine Corps leaders and warfighters in the Operating Forces. 
Chapter I identified hypotheses and limitations to establish the scope of this study. 
Chapter II provides a comprehensive literature review to introduce Marine Corps training 
concepts, review the fundamentals of training program evaluation, provide an 
understanding of the acquisition challenges unique to the Marine Corps when purchasing 
IT, and managing associated organizational change. Chapter III details the procedures 
and methods used to address the stated hypotheses. The research variables are explained, 
and validity and reliability of the survey that was implemented in this study are 
addressed. Chapter IV explains the results and findings, and, lastly, Chapter V addresses 
the summary, conclusions, and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review of literature begins with an overview of U.S. Marine Corps 
organizational structure. Following this introduction, current acquisition policy and 
practices are explained to provide the reader with an understanding of the unique 
requirements of the U.S. Armed Forces when developing and purchasing new 
capabilities. Challenges to current policy are also addressed. The next part of the chapter 
focuses on training within the Marine Corps following the purchase of a new capability. 
The subject of training program evaluation is introduced to explain how effectiveness can 
be determined. Following these topics, the subject of an information system strategy is 
introduced, which takes the reader closer to the problem within this study. Lastly, as a 
result of introducing an information system strategy, organizational change management 
is addressed to highlight how the implementation of new systems can have a better 
chance of success. 
U.S. Marine Corps Organizational Structure 
Operating as part of the U.S. Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps is 
relatively small when compared to the other armed forces of the United States. "Since 
1775, the Marine Corps has served as an expeditionary force organized and trained to act 
in the national security interest and carry out the national military strategy" (MCDP 1 -0, 
1998, p. 1-4). Currently, the Active Component of the Marine Corps consists of just over 
202,000 Marines, and due to anticipated budget cuts looming ahead, this number will 
likely fall to a number closer to 180,000 (SeaPower, 2011). The Marine Corps Reserve 
consists of approximately 40,000 Marines. This number will likely remain the same 
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following a sharp decrease in overall personnel. The Marine Corps' organization consists 
of four major components, which include Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the operating 
forces, the supporting establishment, and Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) 
(MCDP 1-0, 1998). Due to current operations, there seems to be more of a blend of active 
and Reserve Marines in the operating forces. Many Reserve Marines have mobilized as 
an individual augment to the active forces, while there is a routine cycle of reserve units 
deploying in support of real-world operations along with active duty units. 
Warfighting Functions 
The Marine Corps is organized around six warfighting functions. These include 
Command and Control (C2), maneuver, fires, logistics, intelligence, and force protection 
(MCRP 5-12D, 1998). Although these are all independent of one another, no function 
successfully operates without C2. "C2 is the overarching warfighting function that 
enables all other warfighting functions" (MCDP 1-0,1998, p. A-l). Despite its critical 
importance, there is no primary military occupational specialty (MOS) centered on 
exercising C2 within the Ground Combat Element (GCE). The communications 
occupational field (OCCFLD) provides the infrastructure to enable C2, but it does not 
have the primary mission of exercising C2. This responsibility lies with the users of the 
technology. For example, an infantry battalion uses the C2 systems during operations, 
while the communicators assigned to that unit build the network architecture, load 
required software, and provide telephone and radio systems. 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Organization and Structure 
During times of crisis, the Marine Corps responds to requests for forces by 
deploying a task-organized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTF 
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spans the warfighting functions to provide an expeditionary warfighting capability 
consisting of four components: a Command Element (CE), a Ground Combat Element 
(GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Logistics Combat Element (LCE). By 
organizing the MAGTF this way, the Marine Corps deploys with organic assets and 
supplies to sustain itself for a period of time until resupply, which is determined by the 
size of the MAGTF. The USMC prides itself on its combined arms capabilities. In the 
Marine Corps, everyone supports the infantry. No single entity or warfighting function 
operates independently. Rather, all elements of the MAGTF support common objectives. 
Although specific tasks may differ amongst the different MAGTF elements, operational 
and strategic objectives are shared (MCDP 1-0, 1998). 
The size and structure of the MAGTF is dependent upon operational 
requirements. The largest MAGTF structure is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). 
There are three standing MEFs during peacetime and war. I MEF is headquartered in 
Camp Pendleton, CA; II MEF is headquartered in Camp Lejeune, NC; and III MEF is 
headquartered in Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan. The next MAGTF structure is a 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), which is smaller than a MEF, but still considered 
a "middle-weight" fighting force (MCDP 1-0,1998, p. 3-17). Beyond the MEB, at any 
given time, each MEF deploys a sea-based Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which is a 
forward-deployed, task-organized, sea-based MAGTF operating from naval vessels. 
Lastly, a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) may be temporarily formed to fulfill a 
variety of missions such as humanitarian assistance/disaster recovery (HA/DR) following 
a natural disaster or military operations other than war (MOOTW) (MCDP 1-0, 1998). 
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Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) Organization 
There are several entities that are assigned to HQMC; however, relevant to this 
study, there are some organizations that directly affect Marine Corps C2 systems, as 
described in the context of this study. The Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command (MCCDC) is commanded by a Lieutenant General. This general officer is also 
dual-appointed as the Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration (DC, 
CD&I). Within DC, CD&I, the Capability Development Directorate (CDD) consists of 
integration divisions organized to address capability gaps across the warfighting 
functions. Also organized under MCCDC is the Training and Education Command 
(TECOM), which is commanded by a Major General. The primary organization that 
provides user-level training on C2 systems is under TECOM, and it is currently directed 
by a GS-15. Under the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC), Marine 
Corps Systems Command (MCSC) exists to manage acquisitions of new equipment and 
oversee programs throughout their life cycle. MCSC is commanded by a Brigadier 
General. 
Marine Corps Strategic Documents 
To maintain itself as a persistent force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps periodically 
adjusts its long-term objectives based on guidance set forth by the Department of Defense 
(DoD) and the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV). Marine Corps Vision and Strategy: 
2025 (2009a) aims to highlight anticipated threats, and how the Marine Corps should 
prepare for the next global crisis through training, equipping, and manning the operating 
forces to ensure the Marines are poised to take on the next challenge that lies ahead. 
According to Marine Corps Vision and Strategy: 2025, the Marine Corps will "better 
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educate and train Marines on the challenges and opportunities presented by the 
Information Age so that it becomes inherent in everything we do" (p. 34). The Marine 
Corps Service Campaign Plan 2009-2015 (2009b) addresses how the Marine Corps will 
address these issues and outlines high-level tasks to prepare for future requirements. 
Although the nation's adversaries are often unpredictable, the Marine Corps is able to 
determine general regions where instability threatens global commerce and human rights. 
The Commandant's Planning Guidance (2010) highlights how the Marine Corps will 
achieve readiness objectives to meet the nation's needs in times of crisis. This document 
further states that "we will better educate and train our Marines to succeed in distributed 
operations and increasingly complex environments" (p. 12). This document is published 
every time a new Commandant is sworn in by the President of the United States. 
All of these foundational documents are critical to shaping the future Marine 
Corps to ensure readiness at a moment's notice when the nation calls upon the Marine 
Corps to respond to a situation, whether it be peacekeeping or high intensity conflict on 
the horizon. It is important to note that the Marine Corps does not operate independently. 
Most, if not all military operations are joint, in nature, and an increasing number of 
military operations are conducted by a multi-national alliance or coalition (MCDP 1-0, 
1998). Joint operations references U.S. armed forces operating collaboratively, while 
multi-national partnerships, alliances, and coalition operations implies collaborative 
efforts of U.S. armed forces and partnering nations. Operating with sister services and the 
services of other nations often adds to the complexity of an operation, and it creates 
additional requirements to exercise C2 across geographical boundaries and ethnic 
cultures. 
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Marine Corps Command and Control Doctrine 
C2 serves as an overarching warfighting function that enables the sharing of 
information among personnel, structure, and equipment across all echelons of the 
MAGTF. MCDP 6-0 (1997) provides the foundational knowledge needed to exercise C2 
during any crisis or conflict. MCDP 6-0 defines C2 as "the exercise of authority and 
direction over assigned and attached forces in support of a mission" (1997, p. A-3). As 
the information age has taken shape, the Marine Corps has rapidly embraced technology 
across the warfighting functions to distribute and share information across geographically 
separate entities of the MAGTF. With this adoption of new technology, problems have 
been realized with ensuring Marines know how to optimize the use of these technologies. 
Throughout this research, these technologies are generalized as C2 systems. C2 systems 
can be broadly compared to information technology (IT) used by any organization. There 
are several C2 systems used across the warfighting functions. The use of C2 systems is 
primarily driven by billet assignment, vice military occupational specialty (MOS) or 
occupational field. In the next section of this literature review, the reader is introduced to 
the guiding policy that shapes how the Marine Corps purchases and implements new 
capabilities. 
Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations 
To maintain readiness, the DoD must pursue new technologies to gain a decisive 
advantage over our adversaries. Because the DoD is funded by the American taxpayer, 
acquisition professionals must exercise diligent practices to ensure that these resources 
are well-spent. DOD Directive 5000.1 (2003) establishes the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) to ensure that DoD acquisition policy is both sound and legal. "The 
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Defense acquisition system exists to manage the nation's investments in technologies, 
programs, and product support necessary to achieve the national security strategy and 
support the United States armed forces" (DoD Directive 5000.1, 2003, p. 2). Because 
nearly all DoD acquisition initiatives are contracted to the private sector, the FAR 
establishes strict guidelines to ensure all contracts are fairly and openly competitive. 
The Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS) 
The Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System defines the process 
DoD components must follow when evaluating its current and future capabilities. This 
analysis is driven by desired capabilities, and it is called Capabilities-Based Analysis. 
Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System consists of several steps and 
processes, which must occur when forwarding new initiatives (CJCSM 3170.01G, 2009). 
The first step in the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System is the 
Functional Area Analysis. Regardless of where the Functional Area Analysis originates, 
whether it is directed by the DoD, or internal to the service, the outputs remain the same. 
Generally, the outputs of the Functional Area Analysis define desired capabilities and 
produce a list of associated tasks to achieve this capability. 
The second step of the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System is 
the Functional Needs Analysis. Within the Functional Needs Analysis, capability gaps 
are identified based on the associated tasks discovered within the Functional Area 
Analysis. Additionally, desired timeframes for capabilities are considered to determine 
the priority of addressing capability gaps. 
The third step of the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System is the 
Functional Solutions Analysis. During the Functional Solutions Analysis, the sponsor 
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attempts to mitigate capability gaps through what is known as the DOTMLPF analysis. 
DOTMLPF is an acronym for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
education, personnel, and facilities. During the DOTMLPF analysis, the services attempt 
to mitigate or resolve a capability gap through changing the approach to one, or more, of 
these pillars. If the capability gap cannot be resolved through a DOTMLPF change 
request (DCR), the sponsor begins the Ideas for Materiel Approaches stage of the 
Functional Solutions Analysis. The Ideas for Materiel Approaches consists of 
brainstorming and information collection to determine what is currently being done 
within the federal government, DoD, and private sector regarding similar or related 
technological development. Following the Ideas for Materiel Approaches stage, the 
Analysis for Materiel (or non-materiel) Approaches stage begins. During the Analysis for 
Materiel Approaches stage, the sponsor will conduct an analysis to determine the best 
possible approach to resolve the capability gap. The results of the Analysis for Materiel 
Approaches should provide a detailed list of the best approaches to address the gap, 
whether it be a DOTMPLF change, a new materiel solution, or both. This list is based on 
the information developed during the Functional Needs Analysis. The Functional 
Solutions Analysis must address the impact of changing current capabilities, when 
technology will be ready to meet the capability gap, and how the DOTMLPF changes 
may impact the current operational environment. There are often third-order effects of 
making changes that must not be overlooked during the Functional Solutions Analysis. 
The final step in the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System is the 
Post-Independent Analysis. This step serves as a check-and-balance to ensure the analysis 
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was done thoroughly, did not overlook other initiatives, and the work was done 
completely. 
Following the Post-Independent Analysis, work will begin to complete a 
DOTMLPF Change Request or begin work on an initial capabilities document. The initial 
capabilities document outlines the results of the Capabilities-Based Analysis. Within the 
initial capabilities document, the capability gap is defined and materiel/non-materiel 
solutions are introduced that may resolve that capability gap. Following the initial 
capabilities document, the capabilities development document is developed to identify 
the performance attributes of a materiel solution required to mitigate a capability gap. If a 
materiel solution is not required, the capabilities development document and further 
documentation is not required. After the capabilities development document, the 
capability production document is produced to identify the concept of operations for the 
new materiel solution, a program summary, the number of systems required during each 
phase of development, and other associated programmatic information. Each of the Joint 
Capabilities and Integration Development System documents is specifically tied to an 
acquisition milestone. The initial capabilities document is required for Milestone A; the 
capabilities development document is required for Milestone B; the capabilities 
production document is required for Milestone C. Each materiel solution is also assigned 
an acquisition category (ACAT). Typically, the higher cost of the program, the higher the 
ACAT, which requires higher levels of approval prior to proceeding with program 
development. 
The focal point of the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System 
relevant to this study is how the capabilities-based analysis is conducted. Within the 
Marine Corps, there is an established process to meet the requirements set forth in the 
Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System. 
Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS) 
In response to the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System, the 
Marine Corps introduced the Expeditionary Force Development System, which was last 
updated in 2008. The Expeditionary Force Development System is divided into four 
distinct phases. Phase I addresses the Functional Area Analysis and Functional Needs 
Analysis steps as described in the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System 
(CJCSM 3170.01G, 2009). There are no deviations or additions associated with Phase I. 
Phase II begins by conducting the Functional Solutions Analysis, and it addresses a 
solutions planning directive (SPD), which addresses how the new solution(s) will be 
implemented or how the Marine Corps plans to pursue the required capability. 
Additionally, Phase II develops a MAGTF Requirements List (MRL), which identifies 
how the Marine Corps will prioritize the desired capability and how the new initiative 
will compete for funding in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process. Phase 
III is the program development phase. At this time, assigned action officers develop 
briefings for the Warfighting Investment Program Evaluation Board (WIPEB) and the 
Training Program Evaluation Board (PEB). These boards are presented with materials to 
inform their decisions on future funding within the POM process. It is important to note 
the WIPEB and the Training PEB are two distinct bodies. The Expeditionary Force 
Development System concludes during Phase IV. This phase is called Capabilities 
Integration and Transition. During Phase IV, performance is monitored to ensure the 
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fielded capability is meeting the performance objectives set forth during the Functional 
Solutions Analysis (MCO 3900.15B, 2008). 
Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) 
In 2008, the Marine Corps established a process to address current mission-
critical capability gaps as identified by the operating forces. To initiate the UNP, an 
urgent universal needs statement must be endorsed by a general officer and formally 
submitted to Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration. Typically, 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment is identified to fill the capability gap, which 
circumvents the deliberate expeditionary force development system. Although this 
process aids the warfighter by providing a near-term capability, inherent risk is accepted 
across the DOTMLPF construct (MCO 3900.17, 2008). While diligently working to help 
the warfighter, total life-cycle costs are often underestimated. While some equipment is 
relatively easy to use, other solutions may be more complex requiring user training. 
Determining who will provide required training and where the money will come from to 
support that requirement presents challenges following the original decision to support 
the urgent universal needs statement process. 
Challenges with Current Acquisition Processes 
In 2009, Kerber (2009) of the Defense Science Board Task Force addressed the 
House Armed Services Committee regarding defense department acquisition reform. He 
cited two major problems with the current policy including: 1) the time it takes to 
develop and implement new technologies, and 2) the time it takes to implement new 
information technology (IT) within DoD. According to Kerber, it takes twice as long for 
the DoD to acquire new IT systems as it does in the private sector. When Marines are 
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presented with a new technological development, Gibbs (2009) states that Marines often 
refer to a three-year tour, which is typically the length of time a Marine will remain at 
one duty station. By the time a new idea is presented, those Marines will have moved on 
well before the new technological solution is fielded. In an organization that requires the 
newest innovations to maintain a decisive advantage over their adversaries, this is simply 
too long (Kotzian, 2010). From the introduction of a new initiative to the time of fielding 
to its warfighters, the technology is already outpaced by new technological solutions. 
To overcome some of these challenges, Kerber (2009) recommends four distinct 
things that can be done differently to address these shortcomings. Potential solutions 
identified in this congressional testimony included: 1) buying the right capabilities at the 
right time, 2) implementing leadership teams to pay close attention to what we buy, and 
how we buy them, 3) reforming the current acquisition process to address different 
technological areas, and 4) improving the execution of acquisition policy. All of these 
recommendations appear to be well-founded. The third recommendation touches the core 
of this study. Broadly applying an acquisition policy to all functional areas is not the best 
approach. For example, changes in weaponry do not occur at the same rate of advance as 
information technology, yet the same approach is exercised. Some of the weaponry used 
in the current Marine Corps has been used for years and still works effectively, while new 
IT that was fielded just recently is already outdated. This is particularly problematic 
considering that the United States is no longer the most technologically advanced among 
technologically literate nation-states. To be better prepared to address the next conflict, 
this issue must be addressed to position the U.S. to be best prepared to answer 
tomorrow's crisis. 
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Further supporting Kerber's (2009) claims, U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) issued a report in March, 2009, addressing the status of the top acquisition 
programs. According to this report, "total research and development costs are now 42 
percent higher than originally estimated, and the average delay in delivering initial 
capabilities is now 22 months. In addition, 42 percent of the programs reported a 25 
percent or more increase in acquisition unit costs" (GAO, 2009, p. 6). More recently, 
referring to DoD, a top General was quoted stating " the department is pretty much in the 
Stone Age as far as IT is concerned" (Thibodeau, 2011, p. 1). Several reasons for this 
problem were cited including proprietary systems, long acquisition timelines, and the 
ever-changing world of IT. If high-level officials acknowledge the problem, this further 
states the need for change in current policy, and more importantly, execution. 
Although some of these challenges can be mitigated through the Urgent Needs 
Process, programmatic risk is introduced after the initial fielding of new equipment. If the 
dollar amount of a required capability is relatively high, the required capability must go 
through the Expeditionary Force Development System. While this increases development 
time, it also ensures the program is handled correctly throughout its life-cycle. 
Previously addressed when explaining the Joint Capabilities and Integration 
Development System, the DOTMLPF analysis construct was introduced. Regarding new 
IT, training is of significant importance. If training is not addressed very early in an 
acquisition initiative, the desired capability may result in less than optimal performance. 
The next section of this literature review will address Marine Corps training, in general, 
followed by specifics of IT and information systems. 
Marine Corps Training and Education 
Similar to all U.S. armed forces, the Marine Corps has the responsibility to train 
and equip its forces to maintain readiness for current and future operations. In How to 
Conduct Training (MCRP 3-OB, 1996c), the Marine Corps identifies two types of 
training, which include individual training and collective training. Deeply rooted into 
Marine Corps ethos, all Marines gain an appreciation for the "train as we fight" concept 
(MCRP 3-OB, 1996c, p. 1-1). Placing a heavy emphasis on training and readiness, 
training policy states "Marine Corps training is standards-based, performance-oriented, 
and prioritized in accordance with mission requirements" (MCRP 3-OB, 1996c, p. A-l). 
Training standards are established at the individual and collective levels. To meet this 
demand, the Marine Corps has established training and education policy in its Systems 
Approach to Training (SAT) Manual (SAT Manual, 2004). To better explain the SAT 
process and highlight how to use it, a user's guide was published in 2010 (NAVMC 
1553.1,2010). 
Marine Corps Systems Approach to Training Manual 
The SAT Manual is based on the widely adopted ADDIE model of instructional 
system design. ADDIE is an acronym for five phases of curriculum development, which 
includes analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate. 
During the analyze phase, an occupational field and/or military occupational 
specialty asks what that particular community does currently, and how the associated 
training meets these tasks. This phase is completed by performing a job analysis and a 
task analysis. At the conclusion of the analyze phase, individual training standards are 
identified and considered for incorporation into training during the next phase. 
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The design phase compares the newly identified list of individual training 
standards with the current learning objectives addressed by formal schools. Formal 
schools are recognized as such by the Marine Corps. Some provide entry-level training or 
military occupational specialty (MOS) training, while others provide Professional 
Military Education (PME), which varies according to rank. At this time, decisions are 
made to determine what changes are required to existing instruction to incorporate the list 
of individual training standards. Additionally, the formal school identifies the target 
population description, updates learning objectives and sequence, selects delivery 
methods, and writes test items (SAT Manual, 2004). 
During the development phase, instructional materials are developed or modified, 
course schedules are developed, course descriptive data is developed to support the 
training, and the program of instruction is completed. The course descriptive data and 
program of instruction serve as the overarching curriculum documents on which funding 
decisions are made. 
The implement phase consists of instructor preparation and content delivery to 
ensure a transfer of knowledge from instructor to student. With newly modified programs 
of instruction, this phase is often repeated making minor changes to ensure the materials 
are best delivered to enable student success. 
Lastly, although very important, the evaluate phase is implemented on a recurring 
basis. This phase addresses both formative and summative assessments in an attempt to 
address overall course effectiveness (NAVMC 1553.1, 2010). Although the evaluate 
phase is clearly identified in the SAT Manual, many formal schools do not perform 
training program evaluation beyond student reaction. This is partly due to access to 
former students, but it is also due to training organizations not being held accountable for 
their own assessment and evaluation efforts (MAGTF-TC, 2010). 
Marine Corps Ground Training and Readiness Manual Program 
The Marine Corps Ground Training and Readiness Manual Program was 
established in 2005 to identify training standards and policy in all occupational fields 
within the Marine Corps (MCO P3500.72A, 2005). The training and readiness process 
began in the aviation community and as a result of its success, Training and Education 
Command determined that this model would serve the Ground Combat Element and 
Logistics Combat Element just as well. Each occupational field now has its own training 
and readiness manual, which establishes the tasks, conditions, and standards required to 
perform each mission-essential task relevant to that occupational field. 
Training and readiness manuals are written to address individual core capabilities 
up to and including unit core capabilities to perform the various missions that a particular 
type of unit may encounter. The training and readiness manual is the cornerstone 
document from which individual skills are developed within a military occupational 
specialty community. The training and readiness manual shapes training at formal 
schools and unit training as they prepare for deployment into harm's way. The training 
and readiness manuals are routinely updated to incorporate newly required skills and 
remove outdated material. 
Some challenges with the training and readiness manual system exist due to the 
fact that there are typically multiple occupational fields represented in any single unit. 
Commanders must ensure that time is made available to address individual training 
requirements of Marines and Sailors from different occupational fields while still 
accomplishing unit training objectives. During pre-deployment training, this balance is 
often difficult to achieve. Entry-level training, alone, may not be enough for the 
individual Marine to form and further-develop required skills and adopt an increased 
level of responsibility. For that reason, the commander must find a balance in achieving 
individual training objectives while preparing for overall unit success in a given mission. 
Force Generation Process 
In 2010, the Marine Corps published Marine Corps Order 3502.6, which 
establishes a service-wide force generation process. The intent of this order is to focus the 
efforts of manning, equipping, and training units that are preparing to deploy. It also 
establishes service-level pre-deployment training requirements (MCO 3502.6, 2010). As 
currently written, the pre-deployment training program is conducted on a four-block 
construct. Block one addresses individual training; block two addresses collective, small-
unit training; block three addresses advanced collective training at the battalion-level; and 
block four consists of a mission rehearsal exercise, which is intended to serve as an 
overall assessment of the deploying unit's proficiency. The assessment is conducted by a 
training entity working under the Training and Education Command. The success or 
failure of units during the pre-deployment training program rests with the unit 
commander; however, if the unit is not properly manned, trained, and equipped, the unit 
is not positioned to perform well during the assessment period (MAGTF-TC, 2010). C2 
system training is not currently mandated during the pre-deployment training program, 
therefore, this is made available to unit commanders, but they are not required to send 
their Marines to the training prior to their mission rehearsal exercise and/or deployment. 
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Training Program Evaluation 
This section of the literature review broadly addresses training program 
evaluation challenges and strategies to mitigate those issues. To determine the best way 
to address evaluation, there may be something learned from the private sector. In 2008, 
American corporations spent approximately $134 billion on employee training programs 
(Baun & Scott, 2010). Despite these high expenditures, many organizations do not 
recognize the need for training program evaluation (Lingham, Richley, & Rezania, 2006). 
This is partly due to the fact that training programs rarely produce measurable data which 
would prove the value of the training investment (Pineda, 2010). One reason these data 
are not produced is due to the lack of indicators of training effectiveness. According to 
Praslova (2010), selecting appropriate indicators of training effectiveness is difficult for 
organizations if the criteria to measure effectiveness are not well defined. This leads to 
the root of the problem. To ensure effective training, the training provider must 
implement training program evaluation. 
Implementing Training Program Evaluation 
Although a challenging task, assessing the value of training programs must be 
incorporated into the needs assessment stages of a training program. It is also important 
that leadership buy-in to the idea of assessing the training program early in the 
development phase (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2010). As highlighted by Brauchle and 
Schmidt (2004), one training program evaluation model, which has gained wide 
acceptance, is Kirkpatrick's model, first introduced in 1979. Kirkpatrick's model includes 
four levels of evaluation which address student reaction; knowledge, skills, and attitudes; 
behavior; and results. Even though the Kirkpatrick model represents a solution for 
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organizations which have yet to implement training program evaluations, relatively few 
organizations are doing so. According to Sims (1993), organizations either lack the 
knowledge in creating a useful evaluation method or they do not recognize the need for 
an effective evaluation tool. With relatively high expenditures on training initiatives and 
programs, this area has significant room for improvement. 
Determining Training Effectiveness 
Corporations that do implement training program evaluation typically utilize 
Return on Investment (ROI) methods to measure effectiveness (Brauchle & Schmidt, 
2004). ROI can be measured in several different ways, but most are directly tied to 
employee performance following the training. For example, time saved, or increased 
output can be compared to a dollar figure. For organizations in fields where production 
cannot be easily measured, ROI may not be the best metric (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 
2010). Additionally, public sector organizations cannot easily equate ROI as a strong 
measure of a training program's success (Sims, 1993). 
Whether private or public sector, organizations should strive for constant 
improvement to new and/or existing training programs. Sims (1993) conducted a case 
study to determine why evaluations were not widely conducted in public sector training 
programs. During this study, Sims found that there was no shared understanding about 
what should be included in a course evaluation. Sims further suggested that evaluation of 
training is often difficult and time-consuming; program administrators assume that the 
training will be sufficient; and lastly, administrators who champion the training may feel 
threatened by an objective evaluation that may discredit the training program (1993). 
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Training programs often present dynamic challenges. Training development must 
not be viewed as a snapshot in time, but, rather, addressed continuously to ensure 
students are receiving the best possible training product within reasonable resource 
constraints (Praslova, 2010). The dynamic nature of establishing training programs 
highlights potential barriers to the implementation of effective evaluation tools, which is 
most likely seen in both, public and private-sector organizations (Sims, 1993). 
Organizational leadership must champion training initiatives if resources are to be 
applied to making improvements (Pineda, 2010). Sims' findings identify an 
organizational change problem, which is outside of the scope of this study, but worthy of 
analysis on a larger scale (1993). 
Using the Kirkpatrick model, it is necessary to determine which level of training 
is being evaluated. The same evaluation cannot be widely applied across all four levels 
because each level would identify different results. According to Kirkpatrick and 
Kirkpatrick (2010), organizations must determine the evidence that would be required at 
each of the four levels to show a training program was successful. When measurement 
methods, tools, and techniques are clearly defined at the start of an initiative evaluation is 
much easier to perform (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2010). For example, evaluating 
training according to Level I of the Kirkpatrick model would assess student reaction, 
while Level III would assess demonstrated student behaviors. This being said, the 
question still remains: what is an effective training evaluation model which can be widely 
used? 
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Implementing an Effective Evaluation Method 
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2010) assert that ROI may not be the best metric for 
evaluating training programs. They contend that return on expectations (ROE) is a better 
metric. ROE is an evaluation method that begins with trainers having an understanding of 
the desired learning outcomes. Additionally, trainers have stakeholder buy-in that have a 
vested interest in the success of the training program. By including training 
representatives in the decision-making process, trainers will have an idea of the priority 
of the initiative, which is often tied to resources (Sims, 1993). 
Managing a training program is an active and ongoing task. What was adequate 
yesterday may or may not be relevant today. Organizational leaders and trainers must 
continuously evaluate their own curriculum, change the content, and incorporate 
feedback based on course evaluations (Pineda, 2010). If these procedures are not 
conducted, a training program can very quickly be viewed by the training audience as 
irrelevant. Seeking constant improvement of course content and delivery is an inherent 
responsibility of the training organization that must be exercised to maintain currency 
(Sims, 1993). 
When trying to determine students' perceptions of a training program, Fast (1974) 
suggests addressing the measuring of attitudes and behaviors following a training event. 
Behaviors and attitudes are often difficult to measure immediately following training; 
therefore, accurate evaluation may or may not adequately measure effectiveness 
(Brauchle & Schmidt, 2004). However, Fast (1974) suggests that if the trainees will not 
be directly observed following the training, the organizational leadership responsible for 
generating the evaluation can incorporate open-ended questions to attempt to derive 
patterns and trends from the trainees. These types of questions typically enable the 
trainers to gain more insight into what the trainees were thinking after the training has 
taken place. The suggestions made by Fast are specifically evaluating learner reaction, 
which is Level I in Kirkpatrick's model. By thinking through the evaluation process on 
the front end, an organization can establish better curriculum leading toward achieving 
the desired learning outcomes of the organizational leadership (Lingham, Richley, & 
Rezania, 2006). 
Although a significant amount of resources are allocated to training, little 
evidence of effective training evaluation exists (Lingham, Richley, & Rezania, 2006). 
Evaluation must be developed up front as an integral component of training program 
development (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2010). This practice forces the training 
organization to establish widely understood and broadly accepted course content. Course 
evaluation must be implemented to incorporate feedback from the training audience, 
while organizational leaders that are responsible for the training must develop desired 
learning outcomes at the onset of program development (Brauchle & Schmidt, 2004). If 
the process is overly complex, it will most likely lose momentum. Lastly, leadership must 
champion these efforts. If not, it will be very difficult to make noteworthy improvements 
that are reinforced by positive course evaluations (Praslova, 2010). Following these 
procedures, the trainers can ensure they are teaching a quality product that is beneficial to 
the trainees, relevant to the current operating environment, and has the ability to achieve 
the desired end-state of the organizational leadership. 
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Developing an Information Systems Strategy 
In the mid-1990's, a new term was introduced in the field of information systems 
or IT management called enterprise resource planning. Macris (2011) defines an 
enterprise resource planning system as "a set of highly integrated applications, consisting 
of applications modules, which can be used to manage most of the business functions 
within an organization" (p. 1450). Although the benefits of implementing an enterprise 
resource planning system can be significant, Macris claims that the training requirements 
for the users may present a steep learning curve. Beyond training challenges, the 
successful system implementation phase, in itself, is often a major roadblock to the 
success of an enterprise resource planning system. 
Many companies around the world were eager to implement an enterprise system 
to enable shared data across departmental lines. While this can be helpful, particularly for 
a global operation, it can also present significant technological and operational 
challenges. As stated previously, many global IT or information system implementations 
fail miserably (Clegg, 1988). An enterprise system has the ability to solve the gap in 
proprietary systems and enable streamlined efficiencies, but only if the implementation 
strategy is well-developed and communicated across the organization. As a result of 
studying several large companies, Pollais (2003) supports similar claims stating that IT-
intensive organizations can only be successful if information system strategies are 
carefully integrated across all functional areas. 
According to a study conducted by Chen, Mocker, Preston, and Teubner (2010), 
IS strategy is a term routinely used among organizations, but its meaning is not clearly 
articulated. Davis (2000) states that there are multiple components collectively addressed 
by an information system strategy which include the IT infrastructure, data, software 
applications, and IT personnel. Other research indicates that the information system 
strategy must also address the planning, design, and implementation of the systems, 
themselves (Davis, 2000). Somewhere between these two ideologies, it appears that the 
information system strategy must not only address the technical side, but the business 
process aspects of information systems, as well. Following their research, Chen et al. 
(2010) define an information system strategy as "the organizational perspective on the 
investment in, deployment, use, and management of information systems" (p. 237). 
Davenport (1998) claims that organizations must consider the business impact of 
implementing an enterprise system. If the technology changes the operation, the 
enterprise system may not be well-received by the people using the software. Another 
major consideration when implementing an enterprise system is how legacy systems will 
be affected. If the enterprise system will replace legacy systems, leadership and 
technologists must collaboratively address how this will impact business operations. 
Davenport further states "if a company's systems are fragmented, its business is 
fragmented" (p. 123). Although an enterprise system may appear to be a panacea, 
businesses implementing an enterprise system may have to modify their business 
processes to fit the system, which may not be the desired effect (Davenport, 1998). 
Within the Marine Corps, an enterprise system may help to mitigate some of the 
challenges presented by several proprietary, legacy systems that do not adequately share 
information across the warfighting functions. If the Marine Corps were to make this 
consideration, its leaders must prioritize the operational impacts over technological 
capability. 
In 2004, U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) chartered a study to evaluate 
effective IT training practices among leaders from private industry. Powner (2004) found 
that "agencies reported that the most common obstacles to effective training are funding 
and the time that training takes away from normal work hours" (p. 2). This becomes an 
issue of priorities and time available. As IT increases in complexity, there is a direct 
correlation with the required time to train. If users do not know how to operate the 
application, its utility will most certainly be diminished. How can this problem be 
addressed? Powner (2004) found that there were several training management practices 
that were widely used by private industry. Of those, organizations of the federal 
government centered around five key IT training management processes. These processes 
included the following: 
• aligning IT training with strategic goals; 
• identifying and assessing IT training needs; 
• allocating IT training resources; 
• designing and delivering IT training; and, 
• evaluating/demonstrating the value of IT training. 
During the assessment stage of determining IT requirements, an organization could gain 
by incorporating these guidelines. To truly understand the costs associated with 
implementing the appropriate training plan, a training expert must be included in the 
decision-making process. If this is overlooked, a major adjustment to the budget should 
be anticipated to correct training shortfalls. If not, an organization should expect limited 
utility of the IT solution. 
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In a study conducted by Strassman (2003), DoD IT spending was evaluated. 
Citing a GAO report, the 2002 IT budget exceeded $26 billion. Problem areas were cited 
stating that DoD tends to develop one application at a time, which typically results in 
redundant, stove-piped applications, meaning they are planned without considering 
interoperability (Strassman, 2003). Strassman further claims that investing in a better IT 
infrastructure would improve the success rate of application development and 
implementation. Strassman went on to say that there are three primary areas for the 
improvement of the DoD acquisitions process, which included: 1) determining what 
applications can be delivered immediately; 2) aligning business processes with goals of 
improving infrastructure; and 3) developing a strategy for transition from legacy IT 
applications. If these goals are not met, the DoD will continue to make IT decisions 
independent of one another, driving up costs, and undermining warfighter capability. It 
appears that most industry experts believe that an enterprise IT strategy is more cost 
effective over time. While independent efforts may solve a temporary problem, they may 
result in long-term challenges across the enterprise. 
Responding to Organizational Change as a Result of New IT 
The global, knowledge-based economy requires innovative approaches, smart 
logistics, and constant adaptability to both competition and customer demands. 
Organizations must be able to make quick decisions as challenges arise. Additionally, 
organizations must expect change and deal with it accordingly. The company that 
chooses the status quo without any external focus is typically the one that falls behind 
the competition. As the free market continues to evolve, businesses must stay ahead of 
their competitors. While many long-term employees resist what is often considered just 
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another bright idea, some of the newer and potentially younger employees may welcome 
the change. Warrilow (2004) states that management is often too disconnected from its 
employees and most of the company's natural leaders are not leaders within the formal 
hierarchy. This is the primary reason for animosity between workers and management 
during times of change. However, it seems that the one constant in the free market is 
change (Kettinger, Teng, & Guha, 1997). Leaders should anticipate change, recognizing 
that new ideas, approaches, and strategies are what keep their business afloat. No longer 
can only a good product carry the burden of profitability. It is more about the logistics of 
transforming products from raw materials to finished products in the hands of the 
customer. To do this effectively and efficiently requires constant change. 
This kind of change requires smart implementation approaches, and rather than 
swiftly altering employees' world of work, there has to be a strategy in place so workers 
are not surprised. This kind of surprise is typically not well-received. Leaders must be 
trained on the implementation of major changes in the workplace. Zaccaro and Banks 
(2004) suggest that change management skills must be developed into core 
competencies. Many managers may dismiss this topic as unimportant. Considering that 
employee turnover has an adverse effect on profitability, perhaps introducing major 
workplace changes with a well-developed strategy is in the best interest of the company, 
at large. Managers must embrace change, know that it is coming, and train personnel on 
how to effectively implement change within the organization. 
Prior to implementing change, management must be able to make timely, 
effective decisions that serve the best interest of the organization. Quite frequently, there 
is not enough time, or there is missing information. These are the obvious challenges to 
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making decisions. Sayegh, Anthony, and Perrewe (2004) claim that improved decision-
making skills can be developed if leaders understand an individual's emotions while 
making a decision. How people view a problem provides some insight into why certain 
choices are selected. Understanding these different emotions can help teach decision-
making skills by re-creating problems requiring an immediate decision. However, in the 
real world, many critics believe that decision-makers should be those with experience. 
Experienced leaders often make decisions based on their instinct. Because they may 
have seen and dealt with many difficult situations previously, it typically makes the next 
problem that much more reasonable to resolve. Heskett (2010) asks what is the right mix 
between intuition and analysis? It would be great to conduct a thorough analysis, but 
typically due to time constraints, this is not feasible. Teaching decision-making skills 
has potential if a realistic environment can be re-created to simulate the workplace and 
its unique stressors. If the environment cannot be replicated, a high state of emotions is 
unlikely to be achieved. Change management must be wisely implemented to avoid any 
unnecessary animosity among employees. Decision-making skills can be developed 
through experience, which results in intuition. They can be taught to individuals if the 
stressors of the workplace environment can be replicated. If not, emotions will not tell us 
how we will react, because they are not the same as they would be in reality. 
In a study conducted by Chiara and Vincenzo (2008), researchers attempted to 
identify if new IT increased productivity. While previous research indicates that 
performance may be increased if IT training is incorporated, organizational change 
measures may have a greater effect than training, alone. In this study, 466 small to 
medium Italian companies were surveyed to determine if absorptive capacity has an 
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effect on productivity. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) define absorptive capacity as an 
organization's ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit external knowledge to increase 
profitability. The researchers determined that absorptive capacity does have a positive 
effect on increased productivity regarding new IT. Companies that were able to use the 
new IT to change processes or develop new approaches to solving problems 
demonstrated higher results. This study indicates that successful implementation of IT 
involved much more than merely the technology, itself. Where training was provided on 
the new software, and where change management strategies were introduced, better 
results were found through survey data. 
According to a study by Kettinger et al. (1997) business process re-engineering 
has taken off due to several factors; one of which is the rapid development of new IT. 
Through interviews with 25 different companies, they found that there were several 
different methods, techniques, and tools used when implementing business process re-
engineering initiatives, but there were some common themes identified when selecting 
new IT. The companies that addressed these common themes showed greater success 
when implementing new IT, and IT-based business process re-engineering initiatives 
within their organization. The first issue addressed the dimension of the entity, which 
included whether the IT would be used internally, cross-departmentally, or to 
communicate with external organizations. Next, different objects were addressed, 
highlighting if the object was physical or informational. Lastly, desired activities were 
introduced, which addressed what the organization hoped to achieve through the use of 
the new IT. These three, together, were cited as common issues addressed when 
implementing IT-based business process re-engineering initiatives. These three areas 
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enable the organization to best-determine what will meet their needs prior to making a 
purchase decision. When implementing new IT within an organization, there are often 
challenges presented beyond the technical difficulty of the new application. To overcome 
these challenges, organizations must be prepared to manage the organizational change 
requirements well before a new information system is presented. Bellamy (2007) states 
"The rapid speed of technological development and its effect on organizational strategy, 
structure, and processes has created a critical need for a systematic approach to managing 
technology" (p. 32). Beyond the technology, users must be properly trained on how to 
use a system prior to its implementation. Chiara and Vincenzo (2008) refer to this aspect 
of organizational change as managing the learning process. Organizations that have the 
ability to manage their learning processes are more inclined to integrate business 
processes within an IT strategy. 
According to a study conducted by Kee-Young and Hee-Woong (2008), the 
failure rate of enterprise system implementation is typically due to reasons other than 
technical problems. This leads one to believe that the technology may be ready, but the 
organization may not be ready, resulting in challenges. One of the key components of the 
study conducted by Kee-Young and Hee-Woong was to assess the willingness of 
employees to use a new enterprise system. The results of the study indicated that the 
employees' readiness for change was a significant contributor to the success of a new 
enterprise system. This so-called readiness for change was a direct result of user training. 
Kertinger et al. (1997) further state that while IT professionals should be involved 
in business process re-engineering efforts, they may lack awareness of strategic goals and 
objectives of the organization. IT personnel must be read into the daily activities and 
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broader organizational objectives to gain a true understanding of where the organization 
is going. With this knowledge, they may be able to see room for process improvement 
that other leaders cannot see or understand. Chung-Jen (2007) conducted a study to 
determine the effects of cross-functional teams on new product development. The results 
suggest that the influence of cross-functional teams was significant on the successful 
development of new products. Pulling in team members from across functional domains 
can have a positive effect on developing and forwarding new initiatives. Martinsons, 
Davison, and Martinsons (2009) claim that a key contributor to an IT-enabled 
organizational change is the culture in which the change is taking place. Considering the 
cultural style of the organization should be addressed during the planning stages of 
change implementation. If not, it is unlikely the change initiative will be well-received by 
those most affected. Introducing IT applications without considering cultural norms 
introduces unnecessary risk. To mitigate this risk, Martinsons, Davison, and Martinsons 
suggest getting the support of the primary stakeholders prior to introducing the new IT 
application (2009). While this seems like an obvious element in a successful IT 
implementation, this is often overlooked. Within many organizations, IT professionals 
attempt to determine what is best for the users without getting critical input prior to 
implementation. This causes resistance to change and often puts leadership at odds with 
the user community. Determining return-on-investment (ROI) of IT systems has been 
difficult for many organizations for quite some time. Leaders want to know the true value 
of their IT investments (Serafeimidis & Smithson, 2000). Most IT evaluation has looked 
at technological aspects without considering the human and organizational components, 
collectively (Serafeimidis & Smithson, 2000). Without considering all contributors in an 
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evaluation of IT, the true ROI can be difficult to determine. Bellamy (2007) states that 
effective planning directly impacts a new technology's success during implementation. 
Before an organization can place value on an information system, they must ask 
themselves if the users were part of the planning process. If they were not, conducting an 
IT evaluation may be somewhat premature. For these reasons, an implementation 
strategy, to include user input and training must be built into the process prior to 
implementation. Following a period of time after the initial implementation, evaluation 
can begin to take place. 
A significant challenge the Marine Corps faces in implementing C2 systems is 
that purchase decisions have been made independently of one another across the different 
warfighting functions. Some are owned and used specifically by an occupational field, 
while others are broadly used throughout the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). 
This results in proprietary systems across the warfighting functions that are not inherently 
interoperable with other systems, nor are they easy for the warfighter to use. While the 
functionality of the system may meet the immediate needs of an occupational field, others 
may gain from the same information. If nobody owns these issues, holistically, across the 
warfighting functions, there is no strategic vision to drive user training. 
Summary 
The Marine Corps has a very unique culture and a diverse mission-type. Due to 
current acquisition policy it is often difficult to predict what IT solution will be required 
and exactly when to purchase new capabilities. By reviewing some of the fundamental 
practices of IT professionals in the private sector, the Marine Corps may be able to 
overcome some of these challenges and build a true enterprise C2 system that is 
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adaptable to a constantly-changing mission. Beyond the IT itself, user training must be 
planned early in the project's life-cycle, and the quality of training must constantly be 
addressed through training program evaluation. If the Marine Corps hopes to maintain an 
information advantage over its adversaries, its C2 system procurement and training 
policies must be addressed through a holistic view. When making purchase decisions, 
change management strategies must be developed to determine how the new IT solution 
will work within a legacy C2 architecture. If any of these components are not addressed, 
the Marine Corps will continue to face challenges in its ability to conduct C2. Chapter III 
explains the research design and addresses the methods and procedures used to conduct 
this study. 
CHAPTER HI 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Recent After-Action Reports of units returning from deployment indicate that 
they were not as well prepared to utilize C2 systems as they needed to be prior to 
deployment (MAGTF-TC, 2010). Because the Marine Corps spends a significant amount 
of money every year to maintain and operate legacy C2 applications and acquire new and 
improved C2 applications, this study is important to determine if the perceptions of the 
warfighters are similar to that of the leaders who make key decisions affecting the future 
of C2 applications used by the Marines on the ground. The purpose of this study was to 
identify potential barriers to the effective employment of C2 systems to enhance 
warfighter readiness. In Chapter III the following topics will be discussed: population, 
research design, instrument design, data collection method, and statistical analysis. 
Population 
The total number of Marines and civilians from Headquarters, Marine Corps and 
the Supporting Establishment affecting C2 system procurement and training is much 
smaller than that of the users in the Operating Forces; therefore, the sample population of 
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment was fewer than that of the 
Operating Forces. Purposeful sampling was utilized to select participants from 
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment who are relatively senior 
leaders contributing to decision-making in terms of purchasing, implementing, and 
training C2 applications within the Marine Corps. Participation was requested from parts 
of Headquarters Marine Corps, Combat Development & Integration, Marine Corps 
Systems Command, and Training and Education Command. Participants from the 
Operating Forces were limited to Mannes within infantry units. This population was 
selected because they are the primary users of the C2 systems addressed in this study. 
The total population of potential participants from Headquarters, Marine Corps 
and the Supporting Establishment is approximately 200 people. Participants from 
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment were invited to participate 
based on organization, billet, and grade. This consisted of Marines who are a Staff Non-
commissioned Officer (SNCO) and above. Civilian employees included in this study 
were GS12 through GS15. 
The total population of potential participants from the Operating Forces is 
approximately 5,000 people. Marines within infantry units were invited to participate in 
the grades of SNCO and above. Rank/Grade was included as a sampling criterion in this 
study because Marines and civilians of these grades are most likely more aware of the 
issues being addressed in this study than that of junior Marines. The objective was to get 
approximately 400 responses from the Operating Forces and 100 from Headquarters, 
Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment. 
Research Design 
This study compared and contrasted perspectives and attitudes of Marines and 
civilian leaders from Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment 
(Combat Development & Integration, Systems Command, and Training and Education 
Command) and infantry Marines from the Operating Forces through survey research. Hoi 
addressed whether or not there is a difference in the perception of effective employment 
of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. H02-H05 addressed 
relationships between different demographic characteristics and the relative perception of 
the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems. These demographic 
characteristics included occupational field (H02), experience (H03), rank (H04), and lastly, 
recent deployment experience (H05). 
The two primary groups of the study included: 1) personnel (Marine and Civilian 
leadership) from Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment and 2) 
Marines from the Operating Forces. To address Hoi, the independent variables (IV) were 
the Marine Corps components consisting of Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting 
Establishment, and the Operating Forces. The dependent variable (DV) was their 
perception and/or attitude about the effective employment of C2 systems across the 
DOTMLPF construct. To address H02 - H05, the IV were the different demographic 
characteristics of respondents, while the DV was perception and/or attitude about the 
effective employment of C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. 
Instrument Design 
Following a review of literature related to the purchase, training, and 
implementation of new IT and associated challenges, a survey was developed to address 
these common themes within the population of this study. The Marine Corps commonly 
addresses issues using the DOTMLPF construct; therefore, the survey was developed 
addressing the primary issues found in the literature within the DOTMLPF construct. 
Data were collected by conducting a survey consisting of 25 questions. Twenty-four 
questions were closed-ended, while one question was open-ended. This question, in 
particular, asked the respondent to write in their occupational field as a four-digit 
number. Survey questions 1 - 5 ask demographic information to establish groups. Table 1 
identifies the primary issues found in the literature, references, and survey questions 
6 - 2 5 . Survey questions 6 - 2 5 used a five-point Likert-scale to determine if the 
participants strongly disagreed, slightly disagreed, were neutral, slightly agreed, or 
strongly agreed with each statement presented within the questions. The survey 
instrument can be found in Appendix B. 
Table 1 
Survey instrument design 
References Survey Questions 
Doctrine 
(Chung-Jen, 2007) 
(Benamati, & Lederer, 2001) 
(Strassmann, 2003) 
(Shore, 2006) 
Organization 
(Baun& Scott, 2010) 
(Chiara & Vincenzo, 2008) 
(Clegg, 1998) 
(Powner, 2004) 
Training 
(Brauchle & Schmidt, 2004) 
(Fast, 1974) 
(Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2010) 
(Lingham, Richley, & Rezania, 2006) 
(Patton, 2002) 
(Pineda, 2010) 
(Praslova,2010) 
(Sims, 1993) 
6. Current Marine Corps doctrine 
provides sufficient guidance to effectively 
employ C2 systems. 
7. Marine Corps doctrine accurately 
reflects C2 employment practices 
witnessed in current operations. 
8. Current tables of equipment (T/E) 
support the effective employment of C2 
systems. 
9. Current tables of organization (T/O) 
support the effective employment of C2 
systems. 
10. C2 system training is an important 
component of pre-deployment training. 
11. Current C2 system training 
adequately supports the effective 
employment of C2 systems in an 
operational environment. 
12. C2 system training should be 
mandated within the pre-deployment 
training program (PTP). 
13. C2 system training is adequately 
emphasized throughout PTP, including 
individual and collective training and 
mission rehearsal exercises. 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Survey instrument design 
References Survey Questions 
Materiel 
(Clegg, 1998) 
(Powner, 2004) 
Leadership and Education 
(Hill & Friday-Stroud, 2009) 
(Langer, 2005) 
Personnel 
(Heskett, 2010) 
(Kettinger, Teng, & Guha, 1997) 
(Warrilow, 2010) 
(Zaccaro & Banks, 2004) 
(Kee-Young, & Hee-Woong, 2008) 
(Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe, 2004) 
Facilities 
(Gomolski, 2006) 
(Grant, 2003) 
14. Marines are generally 
knowledgeable of what C2 system 
training is available at home-station. 
15. Marines are knowledgeable on 
the C2 Training Continuum. 
16. Current C2 systems adequately 
support current operations. 
17. There is a widespread understanding 
of the capabilities of C2 systems across the 
warfighting functions. 
18. C2 system training should be 
incorporated into professional military 
education (PME) programs. 
19. Unit leaders are knowledgeable 
about how to best employ C2 systems in an 
operational environment. 
20. A primary MOS should be 
established to provide dedicated C2 system 
operators. 
21. C2 operator structure should be 
sourced from within the infantry 
occupational field. 
22. Currently, COC personnel are 
adequately trained to perform their assigned 
billet prior to deployment. 
23. COC staff members across the 
warfighting functions are assigned to a unit 
with enough time to conduct PTP with other 
unit members. 
24. Current combat operations center 
(COC) equipment adequately supports 
effective C2. 
25. Units are adequately trained to 
proficiently install, operate, and maintain 
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Validity 
External validity was controlled by developing survey questions addressing 
common issues found within an organization utilizing Information Technology (IT) 
within their business processes. Questions were formed by asking questions of the sample 
groups that can be comparable to questions asked of management and end-users of IT 
within any organization, whether public or private. See Table 2. The survey questions 
asked of both groups contained the same content to ensure the results could be compared 
to one another. 
Table 2 
Addressing external validity in survey instrument 
U.S. Marine Corps Private Sector 
Doctrine Guiding Policy, Business Strategy 
Organization Organizational Hierarchy, Structure 
Training User Training, Administrator Training 
Materiel Hardware, Software, Network Infrastructure 
Leadership and Education Stakeholder Buy-in and Understanding 
Personnel Enough People? The Right People? 
Facilities Where is the IT solution used? 
To address internal validity, content and construct of the survey were reviewed by 
an expert panel prior to survey administration. Prior to meeting with the expert panel, 
they were given instructions, which are located in Appendix C. This expert panel 
consisted of five retired Marine Corps field grade officers who have several years of 
experience in the Marine Corps and currently serve as defense contractors in the area of 
C2. The panel reviewed all survey questions and made recommended changes to clarify 
the content. This panel reviewed the original survey, located in Appendix A. Based on 
their recommendations questions were modified to ensure clarity; however, the content 
within the questions did not change. The revised survey is available in Appendix B. 
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Reliability 
To ensure reliability, a pilot survey was administered prior to data collection to 
ensure internal consistency within the survey. The pilot study included 25 participants 
across the population and was administered in December 2011. Using Cronbach's alpha, 
internal consistency was determined to be .885, which is considered good if greater than 
.80 (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner, & Barrett, 2004). No questions were removed as a result 
of this analysis. The secondary objective of the pilot study was to ensure the survey was 
functional via the web link that was provided. Based on a 100% response rate and 
complete data the survey worked as intended. 
Data Collection Method 
To gain interest in this study, the leadership of several organizations within 
Headquarters, Marine Corps, the Supporting Establishment, and the Operating Forces 
were contacted via electronic mail and telephone to explain the objective of this study 
and ask for their participation. If the leaders agreed to participate, they received an email 
message explaining the objective of the study and the population that would be sampled 
(see Appendix D). At the time of data collection, they were sent another email message 
with the survey web link to simplify distribution to Staff Non-commissioned Officers, 
Officers, and civilian employees within their respective organizations (see Appendix E). 
At the request of several organizational leaders, the survey was made available for 
a thirty-day period to ensure statistical significance. Following the initial survey 
participation invitation, organizational leaders received a reminder email following ten 
business days if responses had not significantly increased. Another reminder email was 
sent if responses had not significantly increased after twenty days from the initial 
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invitation. Lastly, a final reminder was sent out three days prior to the end of the data 
collection period. Following the thirty-day period, statistical analysis began. 
Statistical Analysis 
This study used quantitative analysis based on the responses to the web-based 
survey that was previously distributed to organizational leadership. Other than the initial 
five demographic questions and one open-ended question regarding occupational field, 
the survey questions used a five-point Likert-scale. Descriptive statistics including 
number of responses, group means, and standard deviations were determined for each 
survey question. Further statistical analysis was conducted using Predictive Analytics 
Software (PASW) Statistics GradPack 18.0.0. To address Hoi and H05 a Mest was used to 
compare and contrast sample group means of survey responses to questions spanning 
across the DOTMPLF construct. To address H02, H03, and H04, one-way ANOVA was 
utilized to determine if there was a relationship between different demographic 
characteristics and the way the respondents answered the survey questions across the 
DOTMLPF construct. 
Summary 
The population within this study consisted of those who develop, purchase, and 
train C2 system use and the warfighters who use C2 systems during combat operations. 
Guided by five research hypotheses, the independent variables consisted of different 
demographic characteristics, while the dependent variable was the perception of the 
effective employment of C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. A survey was 
developed based on the literature, which was then presented in the form of the 
DOTMLPF construct. The survey was reviewed by an expert panel, which recommended 
some minor grammatical corrections to ensure clarity. A pilot study consisting of 25 
participants was conducted to address reliability measures. Using Cronbach's alpha, the 
survey scored a .885, which is considered good when equal to or greater than .80. 
Statistical methods used during this study included the /-test for Hoi and H05. One-way 
ANOVA was used to address H02, H03, and H04. 
Chapter IV will identify the findings of the study. Descriptive statistics will be 
provided for each survey question, which will be followed by statistically significant 
findings based on the five hypotheses, if applicable. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
This chapter explains the results of this quantitative study, which was conducted 
during the months of December 2011 and January 2012. The chapter begins by 
addressing the response rate within the population. This is followed by a section on 
demographics, which also addresses the descriptive statistics found in the first five 
questions of the survey. An explanation of the coding used in the study is provided. 
Descriptive statistics for the remaining 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct are 
addressed, which is followed by remarks on internal consistency. Lastly, statistically 
significant findings throughout the five research hypotheses are provided. 
Response Rate 
The purpose of this study was to identify potential barriers to the effective 
employment of command and control (C2) systems to enhance warfighter readiness. 
Using a web-based survey tool, purposeful sampling from organizations within the target 
population resulted in 583 total responses; however, 32 respondents did not complete all 
of the questions. Incomplete data were discarded, which resulted in a sample size of 551. 
To achieve statistical significance, 357 responses were required from the 
Operating Forces, based on a total population of approximately 5,000. Within 
Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment 132 responses were 
required, based on approximately 200 Marines and civilians working in applicable 
organizations (Patten, 2005) directly having an impact on this subject. There were 385 
responses provided from the Operating Forces, while 166 responses were provided by 
members of Headquarters Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment. Therefore, 
the sample size from both organizations met the criteria to provide statistical significance 
at a 95% confidence interval. The response rate from the Operating Forces was 
approximately 8%, while the response rate from Headquarters, Marine Corps and the 
Supporting Establishment was much higher, representing nearly 83%. The total response 
rate was approximately 11%. 
Demographic Characteristics 
The first five survey questions addressed demographic information to determine 
each respondent's rank, experience, occupational field, whether or not they have recently 
deployed, and their current organizational assignment. With the exception of government 
civilians, making up only 4.9% of the respondents, rank distribution among uniformed 
Marines was fairly well-balanced ranging from 27.0% to 34.3% for each category. The 
group having between 12 and 20 years of service provided 44.5% of the total responses. 
Other than this, experience varied widely across the ranks. The infantry occupational 
field provided 73.3% of the responses. All other occupational fields accounted for less 
than 10% each. This was to be expected because the infantry community was the primary 
target audience of the survey. The Operating Forces provided 69.9% of the responses, 
while Marines and civilian employees from Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) and 
the Supporting Establishment (SE) provided 30.1%. Lastly, 78.9% of the survey 
participants claimed to have been forward-deployed in support of real-world operations 
within the 36 months prior to completing this survey. Demographic characteristics are 
shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Demographic characteristics of survey participants (n=551) 
Demographic Characteristics Frequency Percentage 
Rank 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
Company Grade Officers 
Field Grade Officers 
Government Civilians 
Total 
Experience 
0 - 4 Years 
>4 - 8 Years 
>8 - 12 Years 
>12-20 Years 
>20 Years 
Total 
Occupational Field 
Infantry (03XX) 
Other Combat Arms 
Intelligence (02XX) 
Logistics (04XX) 
Communications (06XX) 
Other 
Total 
Recent Deployment 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Organization 
Operating Forces 
HQMC/SE 
Total 
149 
186 
189 
27 
551 
6 
112 
63 
245 
125 
551 
404 
22 
51 
23 
23 
28 
551 
435 
116 
551 
385 
166 
551 
27.0 
33.8 
34.3 
4.9 
100.0 
1.1 
20.3 
11.4 
44.5 
22.7 
100.0 
73.3 
4.0 
9.3 
4.2 
4.2 
5.1 
100.0 
78.9 
21.1 
100.0 
69.9 
30.1 
100.0 
Coding 
Some responses were coded to enable statistical analysis and appropriate 
grouping. Question 1, which focused on rank, combined GS09 - GS12 with GS13 -
GS15, which were option four and five, respectively. On the survey, these were kept 
separately to identify different categories of seniority associated with pay. Following data 
collection, these two options were combined because there are no civilians in the 
Operating Forces. All civilian employees either work at Headquarters, Marine Corps or 
within the Supporting Establishment. 
Question 3 was coded to quantify responses that were entered in as four-digit 
occupational fields or military occupational specialties. Because the infantry occupational 
field (03XX) was the primary target population, they were assigned number 1. Other 
Combat Arms, which consists of artillery (08XX), combat engineers (13XX), and 
tank/amphibious assault vehicle operators (18XX) were assigned number 2. Number 3 
was assigned to 02XX (intelligence) personnel. Number 4 was assigned to 04XX 
(logistics) personnel. Number 5 was assigned to 06XX (communications) personnel, 
while number 6 was assigned to all other occupational fields. All others accounted for 
only 5.1% of the sample population. 
Question 4 addressed recent deployment experience. This was written as a yes or 
no question-type. Those that answered yes were assigned number 1, while those that 
answered no were assigned number 2. 
Question 5 established groups by organization. Operating Forces, Marine Forces 
Reserve, and resident Professional Military Education (PME) students were all assigned 
number 1 and grouped into the Operating Forces group. Reserve Marines frequently 
deploy along side of the Active Component and the leadership of the PME schools were 
asked for feedback from those that had come to the school directly from the Operating 
Forces. Participants from Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment 
were assigned number 2. Using this coding enabled all data to be quantified and provided 
an opportunity for those that were not on active duty, or those attending schools to 
participate with their peers. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Following the initial five demographic questions, the remaining 20 questions were 
spread across the DOTMLPF construct addressing common issues found in the literature 
and relating those issues to current Marine Corps issues surrounding C2. Each of these 
questions was written in the form of a statement. The response options were based on a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) Strongly Disagree to (5) Strongly Agree. 
Descriptive statistics for each category within the DOTMLPF construct is provided 
below. 
Doctrine 
Within the Doctrine category, there were two questions. Question 6 stated the 
following: Current Marine Corps doctrine provides sufficient guidance to effectively 
employ C2 systems. Representing 5.6% of the sample, 31 people strongly disagreed with 
this statement; 157 people slightly disagreed (28.5%); 119 people answered neutral 
(21.6%); 213 people slightly agreed (38.7%); and 31 people strongly agreed with this 
statement (5.6%). The mean response was 3.10, indicating a neutral response to this 
question within the sample, which is reflected in Table 4. 
Question 7 stated the following: Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2 
employment practices witnessed in current operations. Representing 11.8% of the 
sample, 65 people strongly disagreed with this statement; 201 people slightly disagreed 
(36.5%); 115 people answered neutral (20.9%); 154 people slightly agreed (27.9%); and 
16 people strongly agreed with this statement (2.9%). The mean response was 2.74, 
indicating a neutral response to this question within the sample, which is reflected in 
Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics within doctrine (n=551) 
Question 
6 
7 
M 
3.10 
2.74 
Median 
3.00 
3.00 
SD 
1.06 
1.08 
Organization 
Within the Organization category, there were two questions. Question 8 stated the 
following: Current tables of equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 
systems. Representing 18.1% of the sample, 100 people strongly disagreed with this 
statement; 197 people slightly disagreed (35.8%); 91 people answered neutral (16.5%); 
146 people slightly agreed (26.5%); and 17 people strongly agreed with this statement 
(3.1%). The mean response was 2.61, indicating a neutral response to this question within 
the sample, which is reflected in Table 5. 
Question 9 stated the following: Current tables of organization (T/O) support the 
effective employment of C2 systems. Representing 22.5% of the sample, 124 people 
strongly disagreed with this statement; 200 people slightly disagreed (36.3%); 84 people 
answered neutral (15.2%); 131 people slightly agreed (23.8%); and 12 people strongly 
agreed with this statement (2.2%). The mean response was 2.47, indicating that the 
sample slightly disagreed with this statement, which is reflected in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics within organization (n=551) 
Question M Median SD 
8 2.61 2.00 1.15 
9 2.47 2.00 1.14 
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Training 
Within the Training category, six questions reflected statistical significance. 
Question 10 stated the following: C2 system training is an important component of pre-
deployment training. Four people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 
0.7% of the sample; 24 people slightly disagreed (4.4%); 19 people answered neutral 
(3.4%); 111 people slightly agreed (20.1%); and 393 people strongly agreed with this 
statement (71.3%). The mean response was 4.57, indicating that the sample strongly 
agreed with this statement, which is reflected in Table 6. 
Question 11 stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately supports 
the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational context. Thirty-four people 
strongly disagreed with this statement (6.2%); 149 people slightly disagreed (27.0%); 92 
people answered neutral (16.7%); 231 people slightly agreed (41.9%); and 45 people 
strongly agreed with this statement (8.2%). The mean response was 3.19, indicating a 
neutral response to this question within the sample, which is reflected in Table 6. 
Question 12 stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated within 
the pre-deployment training program (PTP). Twenty-four people strongly disagreed with 
this statement (4.4%); 38 people slightly disagreed (6.9%); 36 people answered neutral 
(6.5%); 163 people slightly agreed (29.6%); and 290 people strongly agreed with this 
statement (52.6%). The mean response was 4.19, indicating that the sample slightly 
agreed with this statement, which is reflected in Table 6. 
Question 13 stated the following: C2 system training is adequately emphasized 
throughout PTP, including individual and collective training and mission rehearsal 
exercises. Thirty-one people strongly disagreed with this statement (5.6%); 156 people 
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slightly disagreed (28.3%); 132 people answered neutral (24.0%); 191 people slightly 
agreed (34.7%); and 41 people strongly agreed with this statement (7.4%). The mean 
response was 3.10, indicating a neutral response to this question within the sample, which 
is reflected in Table 6. 
Question 14 stated the following: Marines are generally knowledgeable of what 
C2 system training is available at home-station. Sixty-four people strongly disagreed with 
this statement (11.6%); 225 people slightly disagreed (40.8%); 100 people answered 
neutral (18.1%); 144 people slightly agreed (26.1%); and 18 people strongly agreed with 
this statement (3.3%). The mean response was 2.69, indicating a neutral response to this 
question within the sample, which is reflected in Table 6. 
Question 15 stated the following: Marines are knowledgeable on the C2 Training 
Continuum. Representing 19.6%) of the sample, 108 people strongly disagreed with this 
statement; 247 people slightly disagreed (44.8%); 118 people answered neutral (21.4%); 
73 people slightly agreed (13.2%); and five people strongly agreed with this statement 
(0.9%). The mean response was 2.31, indicating that the sample slightly disagreed with 
this statement, which is reflected in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Descriptive statistics within training (n=551) 
Question M Median SD 
10 4.57 5.00 0.81 
11 3.19 4.00 1.11 
12 4.19 5.00 1.11 
13 3.10 3.00 1.07 
14 2.69 2.00 1.08 
15 2.31 2.00 0.96 
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Materiel 
Within the Materiel category, there were two survey questions. Question 16 stated 
the following: Current C2 systems adequately support current operations. Twenty-seven 
people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 4.9% of the sample; 69 people 
slightly disagreed (12.5%); 107 people answered neutral (19.4%); 292 people slightly 
agreed (53.0%); and 56 people strongly agreed with this statement (10.2%). The mean 
response was 3.51, indicating that the sample slightly agreed with this statement, which is 
reflected in Table 7. 
Question 17 stated the following: There is a widespread understanding of the 
capabilities of C2 systems used across the warfighting functions. Ninety people strongly 
disagreed with this statement, representing 16.3% of the sample; 247 people slightly 
disagreed (44.8%); 108 people answered neutral (19.6%); 96 people slightly agreed 
(17.4%); and 10 people strongly agreed with this statement (1.8%). The mean response 
was 2.44, indicating that the sample slightly disagreed with this statement, which is 
reflected in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics within materiel (n=551) 
Question 
16 
17 
M 
3.51 
2.44 
Median 
4.00 
2.00 
SD 
1.00 
1.02 
Leadership and Education 
Within the Leadership and Education category, there were two questions. 
Question 18 stated the following: C2 system training should be incorporated into 
professional military education (PME) programs. Twenty-five people strongly disagreed 
with this statement, representing 4.5% of the sample; 46 people slightly disagreed 
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(8.3%); 51 people answered neutral (9.3%); 227 people slightly agreed (41.2%); and 202 
people strongly agreed with this statement (36.7%). The mean response was 3.97, 
indicating the sample slightly agreed with this statement, which is reflected in Table 8. 
Question 19 stated the following: Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to 
best employ C2 systems in an operational environment. Thirty-seven people strongly 
disagreed with this statement, representing 6.7% of the sample; 167 people slightly 
disagreed (30.3%); 141 people answered neutral (25.6%); 183 people slightly agreed 
(33.2%); and 23 people strongly agreed with this statement (4.2%). The mean response 
was 2.98, indicating a neutral response to this statement within the sample, which is 
reflected in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Descriptive statistics within leadership and education (n=551) 
Question 
18 
19 
M 
3.97 
2.98 
Median 
4.00 
3.00 
SD 
1.10 
1.04 
Personnel 
Within the Personnel category, there were four questions. Question 20 stated the 
following: A primary MOS should be established to provide dedicated C2 system 
operators. Sixty-five people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 11.8% of 
the sample; 112 people slightly disagreed (20.3%); 100 people answered neutral (18.1%); 
154 people slightly agreed (27.9%); and 120 people strongly agreed with this statement 
(21.8%). The mean response was 3.28, indicating a neutral response to this statement 
within the sample, which is reflected in Table 9. 
Question 21 stated the following: C2 system operator structure should be sourced 
from within the infantry occupational field (OCCFLD). Seventy-seven people strongly 
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disagreed with this statement, representing 14.0% of the sample; 128 people slightly 
disagreed (23.2%); 129 people answered neutral (23.4%); 149 people slightly agreed 
(27.0%); and 68 people strongly agreed with this statement (12.3%). The mean response 
was 3.01, indicating a neutral response to this statement within the sample, which is 
reflected in Table 9. 
Question 22 stated the following: Currently, COC personnel are adequately 
trained to perform their assigned billet prior to deployment. Forty people strongly 
disagreed with this statement, representing 7.3% of the sample; 176 people slightly 
disagreed (31.9%); 121 people answered neutral (22.0%); 194 people slightly agreed 
(35.2%); and 20 people strongly agreed with this statement (3.6%). The mean response 
was 2.96, indicating a neutral response to this statement within the sample, which is 
reflected in Table 9. 
Question 23 stated the following: COC staff members across the warfighting 
functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to conduct PTP with other unit 
members. Seventy-seven people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 
14.0% of the sample; 192 people slightly disagreed (34.8%); 131 people answered neutral 
(23.8%); 140 people slightly agreed (25.4%); and 11 people strongly agreed with this 
statement (2.0%). The mean response was 2.67, indicating a neutral response to this 
statement within the sample, which is reflected in Table 9. 
Table 9 
Descriptive statistics within personnel (n=551) 
Question 
20 
21 
22 
23 
M 
3.28 
3.01 
2.96 
2.67 
Median 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
SD 
1.32 
1.25 
1.05 
1.06 
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Facilities 
Within the Facilities category, there were two questions. Question 24 stated the 
following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately supports 
effective C2. Sixteen people strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 2.9% of 
the sample; 76 people slightly disagreed (13.8%); 118 people answered neutral (21.4%); 
284 people slightly agreed (51.5%); and 57 people strongly agreed with this statement 
(10.3%). The mean response was 3.53, indicating that the sample slightly agreed with this 
statement, which is reflected in Table 10. 
Question 25 stated the following: Units are adequately trained to proficiently 
install, operate, and maintain the COC prior to deployment. Seventy-seven people 
strongly disagreed with this statement, representing 14.0% of the sample; 173 people 
slightly disagreed (31.4%); 124 people answered neutral (22.5%); 162 people slightly 
agreed (29.4%); and 15 people strongly agreed with this statement (2.7%). The mean 
response was 2.75, indicating a neutral response to this statement within the sample, 
which is reflected in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Descriptive statistics within facilities (n=551) 
Question 
24 
25 
M 
3.53 
2.75 
Median 
4.00 
3.00 
SD 
0.95 
1.10 
Reliability 
Following data collection, Cronbach's alpha was once again used to determine 
internal consistency of the survey questions across the DOTMLPF construct. This 
resulted in a score of .818, which is considered good when addressing internal 
consistency (Morgan et al., 2004). 
Statistically Significant Findings 
This study was guided by five research hypotheses, which were written in the 
form of null hypotheses. This section will identify the statistically significant findings of 
each of the five hypotheses. 
Results Related to Organization (Hoi) 
Beginning with Hoi, the null hypothesis was written as follows: There is no 
difference in the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems 
between the Operating Forces and Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment 
across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct. An independent samples Mest was used as 
the statistical method to address Hoi. The Operating Forces (OPFOR) group consisted of 
385 respondents, while Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment 
(HQMC/SE) consisted of 166 respondents. Of the 20 questions across the DOTMLPF 
construct, two questions resulted in statistical significance between the OPFOR and 
HQMC/SE at the 95% confidence interval. 
Question 13, related to training, stated the following: C2 system training is 
adequately emphasized throughout the pre-deployment training program (PTP), including 
individual and collective training and mission rehearsal exercises. The mean response of 
the OPFOR (M= 3.18) was greater than that of HQMC/SE (M= 2.92), tm9) = 2.67, 
(p =.008). 
Question 19, related to leadership and education, stated the following: Unit 
leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an operational 
environment. The mean response of the OPFOR (M= 3.04) was greater than that of 
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HQMC/SE (M= 2.83), /(549)= 2.29, (p =.023). The statistically significant findings for 
Hoi are reflected in Table 11. 
Table 11 
HQI: T-test results indicating statistical significance (n= 385 OP FOR and 166 HQMC/SE) 
Organization M SD / df p 
Q13 
2.67 549 .008* 
OPFOR 3.18 1.07 
HQMC/SE 2.92 1.05 
Q19 
2.29 549 .023* 
OPFOR 3.04 1.04 
HQMC/SE 2J53 L02 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Results Related to Occupational Field (H02) 
Hypothesiso2 aimed to compare responses among several different occupational 
fields across the DOTMLPF construct. H02 stated the following: There is no relationship 
between occupational field and the perception of the effective employment of Marine 
Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. One-way ANOVA was used as the 
statistical method to address this hypothesis. The infantry occupational field (03XX) 
consisted of 404 respondents, which was 73.3% of the sample population. All other 
occupational fields accounted for less than 10% each. Because the infantry community 
was the primary target audience of this study, these numbers were to be expected. Seven 
of the 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct resulted in statistical significance at 
the 95% confidence interval. 
Question 8, related to organization, stated the following: Current tables of 
equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The infantry 
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of 
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2.50. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a 
mean response of 2.82. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 
participants and had a mean response of 2.82. The logistics occupational field (04XX) 
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.09. The communications 
occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.17. All other 
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 2.75. The 
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 2.61. Table 12 
reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 8, F(5, 545) 
= 3.33, p = .006. 
Table 12 
H02: Findings for Question 8 (organization) among different occupational fields 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
03XX (Infantry) 
Other Combat Arms 
02XX (Intelligence) 
04XX (Logistics) 
06XX (Communications) 
Other 
Total 
404 
22 
51 
23 
23 
28 
551 
2.50 
2.82 
2.82 
3.09 
3.17 
2.75 
2.61 
1.14 
1.14 
1.14 
1.12 
1.11 
1.04 
1.15 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
5 
545 
550 
SS 
21.48 
704.06 
725.54 
MS 
4.30 
1.29 
F 
3.32 
P 
.006* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Question 9, also related to organization, reflected statistical significance among 
various occupational fields. Question 9 stated the following: Current tables of 
organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The infantry 
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of 
2.39. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a 
mean response of 2.45. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 
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participants and had a mean response of 2.75. The logistics occupational field (04XX) 
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.22. The communications 
occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 2.30. All other 
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 2.61. The 
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 2.47. Table 13 
reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 9, F(5, 545) 
= 3.18,/? = .008. 
Table 13 
HQ2- Findings for Question 9 (organization) among different occupational fields 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
03XX (Infantry) 404 2.39 1.16 
Other Combat Arms 22 2.45 1.34 
02XX (Intelligence) 51 2.75 0.96 
04XX (Logistics) 23 3.22 1.04 
06XX (Communications) 23 2.30 1.06 
Other 28 2.61 1.03 
Total 551 2.47 1.14 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
5 
545 
550 
SS 
20.38 
698.81 
719.19 
MS 
4.08 
1.28 
F 
3.18 
P 
.008* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Within the Training category of questions, Question 11 reflected statistical 
significance. This question stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately 
supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational context. The infantry 
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of 
3.21. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a 
mean response of 3.00. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 
participants and had a mean response of 3.00. The logistics occupational field (04XX) 
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.78. The communications 
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occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 2.70. All other 
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 3.29. The 
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 3.19. Table 14 
reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 11, F(5, 545) 
= 2.11,p = .018. 
Table 14 
H02: Findings for Question 11 (training) among different occupational fields 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
(Infantry) 
Combat Arms 
(Intelligence) 
(Logistics) 
(Communications) 
404 
22 
51 
23 
23 
28 
551 
3.21 
3.00 
3.00 
3.78 
2.70 
3.29 
3.19 
1.12 
1.23 
1.00 
0.90 
0.82 
1.18 
1.11 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
5 
545 
550 
SS 
16.76 
659.61 
676.37 
MS 
3.35 
1.21 
F 
2.77 
P 
.018* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Also within the Training category of questions, Question 12 reflected statistical 
significance. This question stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated 
within the pre-deployment training program (PTP). The infantry occupational field 
(03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of 4.14. Other Combat 
Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a mean response of 
4.64. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 participants and had a 
mean response of 4.02. The logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 
participants and had a mean response of 4.65. The communications occupational field 
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 4.30. All other occupational 
fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 4.50. The total participants 
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consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 4.19. Table 15 reflects the 
findings among different occupational fields related to Question 12, F(5, 545) = 2.47, 
p = .031. 
Table 15 
HQ2- Findings for Question 12 (training) among different occupational fields 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
03XX (Infantry) 
Other Combat Arms 
02XX (Intelligence) 
04XX (Logistics) 
06XX (Communications) 
Other 
Total 
404 
22 
51 
23 
23 
28 
551 
4.14 
4.64 
4.02 
4.65 
4.30 
4.50 
4.19 
1.14 
0.58 
1.17 
0.49 
1.18 
0.96 
1.11 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
5 
545 
550 
SS 
14.94 
658.67 
673.61 
MS 
2.99 
1.21 
F 
2.47 
P 
.031* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Once again, within the Training category of questions, Question 13 reflected 
statistical significance. This question stated the following: C2 system training is 
adequately emphasized throughout PTP, including individual and collective training and 
mission rehearsal exercises. The infantry occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 
participants and had a mean response of 3.10. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) 
consisted of 22 participants and had a mean response of 2.95. The intelligence 
occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 participants and had a mean response of 3.25. 
The logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a mean 
response of 3.35. The communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and 
had a mean response of 2.30. All other occupational fields consisted of 28 participants 
and had a mean response of 3.32. The total participants consisted of 551 people and 
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reflected a mean response of 3.10. Table 16 reflects the findings among different 
occupational fields related to Question 13, F(5, 545) = 3.40, p = .005. 
Table 16 
H02: Findings for Question 13 (training) among different occupational fields 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
03XX (Infantry) 
Other Combat Arms 
02XX (Intelligence) 
04XX (Logistics) 
06XX (Communications) 
Other 
Total 
404 
22 
51 
23 
23 
28 
551 
3.10 
2.95 
3.25 
3.35 
2.30 
3.32 
3.10 
1.08 
1.13 
1.00 
0.93 
0.97 
0.94 
1.07 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
5 
545 
550 
SS 
19.04 
610.47 
629.51 
MS 
3.81 
1.12 
F 
3.40 
P 
.005* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Within the Materiel category of questions, Question 17 reflected statistical 
significance. This question stated the following: There is a widespread understanding of 
the capabilities of C2 systems used across the warfighting functions. The infantry 
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of 
2.43. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a 
mean response of 2.18. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 
participants and had a mean response of 2.35. The logistics occupational field (04XX) 
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 2.91. The communications 
occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 2.04. All other 
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 2.79. The 
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 2.44. Table 
17 reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 17, 
F(5, 545) = 2.76,/? = .018. 
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Table 17 
H02: Findings for Question 17 (materiel) among different occupational fields 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
2.43 1.01 
2.18 1.05 
2.35 0.93 
2.91 1.08 
2.04 1.02 
2.79 1.03 
2.44 1.02 
03XX (Infantry) 
Other Combat Arms 
02XX (Intelligence) 
04XX (Logistics) 
06XX (Communications) 
Other 
Total 
404 
22 
51 
23 
23 
28 
551 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
5 
545 
550 
SS 
13.99 
553.48 
567.46 
MS 
2.80 
1.02 
F 
2.75 
P 
.018* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Lastly, within the Personnel category of questions, Question 21 reflected 
statistical significance. This question stated the following: C2 system operator structure 
should be sourced from within the infantry occupational field (OCCFLD). The infantry 
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a mean response of 
3.06. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a 
mean response of 2.73. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 
participants and had a mean response of 2.49. The logistics occupational field (04XX) 
consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.09. The communications 
occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a mean response of 3.30. All other 
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a mean response of 3.07. The 
total participants consisted of 551 people and reflected a mean response of 3.01. Table 18 
reflects the findings among different occupational fields related to Question 21, F(5, 545) 
= 2.44,/? = .034. 
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Table 18 
H02: Findings for Question 21 (personnel) among different occupational fields 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
03XX (Infantry) 
Other Combat Arms 
02XX (Intelligence) 
04XX (Logistics) 
06XX (Communications) 
Other 
Total 
404 
22 
51 
23 
23 
28 
551 
3.06 
2.73 
2.49 
3.09 
3.30 
3.07 
3.01 
1.27 
0.98 
1.03 
1.35 
1.36 
1.09 
1.25 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
5 
545 
550 
SS 
18.75 
838.24 
856.98 
MS 
3.75 
1.54 
F 
2.44 
P 
.034* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Results Related to Experience (H03) 
Hypothesiso3 aimed to compare responses across the DOTMLPF construct based 
on experience, or time-in-service. H03 stated the following: There is no relationship 
between experience and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 
systems across the DOTMLPF construct. One-way ANOVA was used as the statistical 
method used to address this hypothesis. There were 245 respondents having between 12 
and 20 years of service, which amounted to 44.5% of the participants. All other 
experience levels varied widely. Six of the 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct 
resulted in statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
The first item reflecting statistical significance associated with different 
experience levels was Question 10, related to training. This question stated the following: 
C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment training. Participants 
having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people and had a mean 
response of 4.83. Participants having greater than four years and up to eight years of 
experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean response of 4.23. Participants having 
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greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63 
people and had a mean response of 4.56. Participants having greater than 12 years of 
experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245 people and had a mean 
response of 4.67. Participants with greater than 20 years of experience consisted of 125 
people and had a mean response of 4.68. The total number of participants consisted of 
551 people and had a mean response of 4.57. Table 19 reflects the findings among 
different levels of experience related to Question 10, F(4, 546) = 6.65, p < .001. 
Table 19 
H03: Findings for Question 10 (training) among different levels of experience 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
0 - 4 Years 6 4.83 0.41 
>4-8 Years 112 4.23 1.00 
>8-12 Years 63 4.56 0.84 
>12-20 Years 245 4.67 0.73 
>20 Years 125 4.68 0.70 
Total 551 4.57 0.81 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
4 
546 
550 
SS 
16.95 
348.11 
365.06 
MS 
4.24 
0.64 
F 
6.65 
P 
.000* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Also within the training category, Question 11 reflected statistical significance 
based on different levels of experience. Question 11 stated the following: Current C2 
system training adequately supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an 
operational context. Participants having between zero and four years of experience 
consisted of six people and had a mean response of 2.33. Participants having greater than 
four years and up to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean 
response of 3.03. Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 
years of experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 2.81. Participants 
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having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 
245 people and had a mean response of 3.29. Participants with greater than 20 years of 
experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 3.36. The total number of 
participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 3.19. Table 20 reflects 
the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 11, F(4, 546) = 
4.75,p = .001. 
Table 20 
H03: Findings for Question 11 (training) among different levels of experience 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
0 - 4 Years 6 2.33 1.03 
> 4 - 8 Years 112 3.03 1.08 
> 8 - 1 2 Years 63 2.81 1.06 
>12-20 Years 245 3.29 1.12 
>20 Years 125 3.36 1.07 
Total 551 3.19 1.11 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
4 
546 
550 
SS 
22.76 
653.61 
676.37 
MS 
5.69 
1.20 
F 
4.75 
P 
.001* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Question 12, also within the training category, reflected statistical significance 
based on different levels of experience. This question stated the following: C2 system 
training should be mandated within the pre-deployment training program (PTP). 
Participants having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people and 
had a mean response of 4.33. Participants having greater than four years and up to eight 
years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean response of 3.88. 
Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of 
experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 4.27. Participants having 
greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245 
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people and had a mean response of 4.25. Participants with greater than 20 years of 
experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 4.31. The total number of 
participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 4.19. Table 21 reflects 
the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 12, F(A, 546) = 
2.84, p = . 024. 
Table 21 
H03: Findings for Question 12 (training) among different levels of experience 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
0 - 4 Years 6 4.33 0.82 
>4-8 Years 112 3.88 1.24 
>8-12 Years 63 4.27 1.05 
>12-20 Years 245 4.25 1.09 
>20 Years 125 4.31 1.03 
Total 551 4.19 1.11 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
4 
546 
550 
SS 
13.73 
659.88 
673.61 
MS 
3.43 
1.21 
F 
2.84 
P 
.024* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Within the personnel category, Question 22 reflected statistical significance based 
on different levels of experience. This question stated the following: Currently, COC 
personnel are adequately trained to perform their assigned billet prior to deployment. 
Participants having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people and 
had a mean response of 3.67. Participants having greater than four years and up to eight 
years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean response of 3.07. 
Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of 
experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 3.19. Participants having 
greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245 
people and had a mean response of 2.85. Participants with greater than 20 years of 
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experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 2.93. The total number of 
participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.96. Table 22 reflects 
the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 22, F(4, 546) = 
2.48, p = . 043. 
Table 22 
H03: Findings for Question 22 (personnel) among different levels of experience 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
0 - 4 Years 6 3.67 1.03 
>4-8 Years 112 3.07 1.11 
>8-12 Years 63 3.19 1.05 
>12-20 Years 245 2.85 1.04 
>20 Years 125 2.93 0.99 
Total 551 2.96 1.05 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
4 
546 
550 
SS 
10.88 
598.24 
609.12 
MS 
2.72 
1.10 
F 
2.48 
P 
.043* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Also within the personnel category, Question 23 reflected statistical significance 
based on different levels of experience. This question stated the following: COC staff 
members across the warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to 
conduct PTP with other unit members. Participants having between zero and four years of 
experience consisted of six people and had a mean response of 3.00. Participants having 
greater than four years and up to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people and 
had a mean response of 2.80. Participants having greater than eight years of experience 
and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 2.90. 
Participants having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience 
consisted of 245 people and had a mean response of 2.64. Participants with greater than 
20 years of experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 2.46. The 
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total number of participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.67. 
Table 23 reflects the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 23, 
F(4, 546) = 2.69, ^  = .030. 
Table 23 
H03: Findings for Question 23 (personnel) among different levels of experience 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
0 - 4 Years 6 3.00 1.55 
>4- 8 Years 112 2.80 1.09 
>8-12 Years 63 2.90 0.93 
>12-20 Years 245 2.64 1.08 
>20 Years 125 2.46 1.01 
Total 551 2.67 1.06 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
4 
546 
550 
SS 
12.05 
610.51 
622.56 
MS 
3.01 
1.12 
F 
2.69 
P 
.030* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Question 24, within the facilities category, was the last question that reflected 
statistical significance based on different levels of experience. This question stated the 
following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately supports 
effective C2. Participants having between zero and four years of experience consisted of 
six people and had a mean response of 4.17. Participants having greater than four years 
and up to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a mean response of 
3.71. Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of 
experience consisted of 63 people and had a mean response of 3.59. Participants having 
greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245 
people and had a mean response of 3.48. Participants with greater than 20 years of 
experience consisted of 125 people and had a mean response of 3.39. The total number of 
participants consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 3.53. Table 24 reflects 
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the findings among different levels of experience related to Question 24, F(4, 546) 
2.64, p = .033. 
Table 24 
H03: Findings for Question 24 (personnel) among different levels of experience 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
0 - 4 Years 
>4 - 8 Years 
> 8 - 1 2 Years 
>12-20 Years 
>20 Years 
Total 
6 
112 
63 
245 
125 
551 
4.17 
3.71 
3.59 
3.48 
3.39 
3.53 
0.75 
0.86 
0.82 
1.01 
0.95 
0.95 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
4 
546 
550 
SS 
9.49 
489.88 
499.37 
MS 
2.37 
0.90 
F 
2.64 
P 
.033* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Results Related to Rank (H04) 
Hypothesises aimed to compare responses across the DOTMLPF construct based 
on the participant's rank. H04 stated the following: There is no relationship between rank 
and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the 
DOTMLPF construct. One-way ANOVA was used as the statistical method used to 
address this hypothesis. The uniformed Marines that responded to this survey were fairly 
well-balanced across the three groups associated with rank. SNCOs provided 149 
respondents. Company Grade Officers provided 186 responses, while Field Grade 
Officers provided 189 responses. Government civilian participants reflected a relatively 
small number of 27 total respondents. This was to be expected based on the small number 
of civilian employees related to uniformed service members. Across the DOTMLPF 
construct, 11 of the 20 questions resulted in statistical significance at the 95% confidence 
interval. 
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The first item reflecting statistical significance associated with different 
experience levels was Question 7, related to doctrine. This question stated the following: 
Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2 employment practices witnessed in current 
operations. Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) consisted of 149 people and had 
a group mean of 3.01. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a group 
mean of 2.63. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean of 
2.62. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group mean 
of 2.74. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.74. 
Table 25 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question 7, F(3, 547) = 
4.67, p = . 003. 
Table 25 
H04: Findings for Question 7 (doctrine) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 149 3.01 1.12 
Company Grade Officers 186 2.63 1.02 
Field Grade Officers 189 2.62 1.05 
Government Civilians (GS12-GS15) 27 2.74 1.23 
Total 551 2.74 1.08 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
15.97 
624.87 
640.84 
MS 
5.32 
1.14 
F 
4.66 
P 
.003* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Within the organization category, Question 8 reflected statistical significance 
among the different ranks. This question stated the following: Current tables of 
equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 systems. SNCOs consisted of 
149 people and had a group mean of 2.79. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 
people and had a group mean of 2.66. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and 
had a group mean of 2.38. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people 
83 
and had a group mean of 2.89. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean 
response of 2.61. Table 26 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question 
8,F(3,547) = 4.49,p = .004. 
Table 26 
H04: Findings for Question 8 (organization) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
1.12 
1.02 
1.05 
1.23 
1.08 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
Company Grade Officers 
Field Grade Officers 
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) 
Total 
149 
186 
189 
27 
551 
2.79 
2.66 
2.38 
2.89 
2.61 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
17.44 
708.10 
725.54 
MS 
5.81 
1.29 
F 
4.49 
P 
.004* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Also within the organization category, Question 9 reflected statistical significance 
among the different ranks. This question stated the following: Current tables of 
organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 systems. SNCOs consisted of 
149 people and had a group mean of 2.72. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 
people and had a group mean of 2.52. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and 
had a group mean of 2.19. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people 
and had a group mean of 2.70. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean 
response of 2.47. Table 27 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question 
9,F(3, 547) = 7.08,p<.001. 
Table 27 
H04: Findings for Question 9 (organization) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
____ 
1.06 
1.14 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
Company Grade Officers 
Field Grade Officers 
149 
186 
189 
2.72 
2.52 
2.19 
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Table 27 (Continued) 
H04: Findings for Question 9 (organization) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics 
Government Civilians (GS12 -
Total 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
-GS15) 
n 
27 
551 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
26.88 
692.32 
719.19 
M 
2.70 
2.47 
MS 
8.96 
1.27 
F 
7.08 
SD 
1.27 
1.14 
P 
.000* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Within the training category, four of six questions reflected statistical significance 
among the different ranks. Question 10 was the first item. This question stated the 
following: C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment training. 
SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 4.57. Company Grade Officers 
consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 4.39. Field Grade Officers consisted of 
189 people and had a group mean of 4.74. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) 
consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 4.63. Total respondents consisted of 551 
people and had a mean response of 4.57. Table 28 reflects the findings among different 
ranks related to Question 10, F(3, 547) = 6.1 \,p < .001. 
Table 28 
H04: Findings for Question 10 (training) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
_ _ 
0.95 
0.69 
0.69 
0.81 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
Company Grade Officers 
Field Grade Officers 
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) 
Total 
149 
186 
189 
27 
551 
4.57 
4.39 
4.74 
4.63 
4.57 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
11.83 
353.23 
365.06 
MS 
3.94 
0.65 
F 
6.11 
P 
.000* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
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Question 11 was the next item within the training category reflecting statistical 
significance. This question stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately 
supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational context. SNCOs 
consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 3.50. Company Grade Officers 
consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 3.03. Field Grade Officers consisted of 
189 people and had a group mean of 3.12. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) 
consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 3.11. Total respondents consisted of 551 
people and had a mean response of 3.19. Table 29 reflects the findings among different 
ranks related to Question 11, F(3, 547) = 5.60,p = .001. 
Table 29 
H04: Findings for Question 11 (training) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 149 3.50 1.02 
Company Grade Officers 186 3.03 1.14 
Field Grade Officers 189 3.12 1.13 
Government Civilians (GS12-GS15) 27 3.11 0.89 
Total 551 3.19 1.11 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
20.15 
656.22 
676.37 
MS 
6.72 
1.20 
F 
5.60 
P 
.001* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Question 12 was the next item within the training category reflecting statistical 
significance. This question stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated 
within the pre-deployment training program (PTP). SNCOs consisted of 149 people and 
had a group mean of 4.43. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a 
group mean of 4.00. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean 
of 4.15. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group 
mean of 4.48. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 
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4.19. Table 30 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question 12, F(3, 
547) = 4.96,/? = . 002. 
Table 30 
H04: Findings for Question 12 (training) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
Company Grade Officers 
Field Grade Officers 
Government Civilians (GS12 -
Total 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
-GS15) 
n 
149 
186 
189 
27 
551 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
17.81 
655.80 
673.61 
M 
4.43 
4.00 
4.15 
4.48 
4.19 
MS 
5.94 
1.20 
F 
4.95 
SD 
0.86 
1.22 
1.15 
0.89 
1.11 
P 
.002* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Question 15 was the last item within the training category reflecting statistical 
significance. This question stated the following: Marines are knowledgeable on the C2 
Training Continuum. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 2.48. 
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 2.17. Field 
Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean of 2.30. Government 
Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 2.41. Total 
respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.31. Table 31 reflects 
the findings among different ranks related to Question 15, F(3, 547) = 3.02, p- .029. 
Table 31 
H04: Findings for Question 15 (training) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
Company Grade Officers 
Field Grade Officers 
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) 
Total 
n 
149 
186 
189 
27 
551 
M 
2.48 
2.17 
2.30 
2.41 
2.31 
SD 
1.02 
0.90 
0.96 
0.97 
0.96 
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Table 31 (Continued) 
H04: Findings for Question 15 (training) among different ranks 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
8.30 
501.63 
509.93 
MS 
2.77 
0.92 
F 
3.02 
P 
.029* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Within the personnel category, there were three questions indicating statistical 
significance. Question 20 was the first item within the personnel category reflecting 
statistical significance. This question stated the following: A primary MOS should be 
established to provide dedicated C2 system operators. SNCOs consisted of 149 people 
and had a group mean of 3.54. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had 
a group mean of 3.01. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group 
mean of 3.30. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a 
group mean of 3.44. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response 
of 3.28. Table 32 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question 20, F(3, 
547) -3 .02, p - .029. 
Table 32 
H04: Findings for Question 20 (personnel) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
_ _ 
1.33 
1.32 
1.34 
1.32 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
Company Grade Officers 
Field Grade Officers 
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) 
Total 
149 
186 
189 
27 
551 
3.54 
3.01 
3.30 
3.44 
3.28 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
24.65 
939.42 
964.07 
MS 
8.22 
1.72 
F 
4.78 
P 
.003* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
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The next item reflecting statistical significance in the personnel category was 
Question 21. This question stated the following: C2 system operator structure should be 
sourced from within the infantry occupational field (OCCFLD). SNCOs consisted of 149 
people and had a group mean of 3.22. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people 
and had a group mean of 3.05. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a 
group mean of 2.76. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and 
had a group mean of 3.26. Total respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean 
response of 3.01. Table 33 reflects the findings among different ranks related to Question 
21,F(3, 547) = 4.52,/? = .004. 
Table 33 
H04: Findings for Question 21 (personnel) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics n M SD 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 149 3.22 1.33 
Company Grade Officers 186 3.05 1.18 
Field Grade Officers 189 2.76 1.20 
Government Civilians (GS12-GS15) 27 3.26 1.29 
Total 551 3.01 1.25 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
20.74 
836.25 
856.98 
MS 
6.91 
1.53 
F 
4.52 
P 
.004* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
The last item reflecting statistical significance in the personnel category was 
Question 23. This question stated the following: COC staff members across the 
warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to conduct PTP with other 
unit members. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 2.67. Company 
Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 2.84. Field Grade 
Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean of 2.55. Government Civilians 
(GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 2.22. Total respondents 
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consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 2.67. Table 34 reflects the findings 
among different ranks related to Question 23, F(3, 547) = 4.12, p = .007. 
Table 34 
H04: Findings for Question 23 (personnel) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
Company Grade Officers 
Field Grade Officers 
Government Civilians (GS12 -
Total 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
-GS15) 
n 
149 
186 
189 
27 
551 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
13.75 
608.80 
622.56 
M 
2.67 
2.84 
2.55 
2.22 
2.67 
MS 
4.58 
1.11 
F 
4.12 
SD 
1.07 
1.05 
1.06 
0.93 
1.06 
P 
.007* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
One item in the facilities category reflected statistical significance. Question 24 
stated the following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately 
supports effective C2. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a group mean of 3.44. 
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a group mean of 3.70. Field 
Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a group mean of 3.40. Government 
Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a group mean of 3.70. Total 
respondents consisted of 551 people and had a mean response of 3.53. Table 35 reflects 
the findings among different ranks related to Question 24, F(3, 547) = 4.15,/? = .006. 
Table 35 
HQ4: Findings for Question 24 (facilities) among different ranks 
Descriptive Statistics 
Staff Non-Commissioned Officers 
Company Grade Officers 
Field Grade Officers 
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) 
Total 
n 
149 
186 
189 
27 
551 
M 
3.44 
3.70 
3.40 
3.70 
3.53 
SD 
0.97 
0.87 
1.01 
0.78 
0.95 
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Table 35 (Continued) 
H04: Findings for Question 24 (facilities) among different ranks 
One-Way ANOVA 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
df 
3 
547 
550 
SS 
11.12 
488.25 
499.37 
MS 
3.71 
0.89 
F 
4.15 
P 
.006* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Results Related to Recent Deployment Experience (H05) 
Hypothesises aimed to compare responses across the DOTMLPF construct 
dependent on whether or not the participant had recently deployed. H05 stated the 
following: There is no relationship between recent deployment experience and the 
perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the 
DOTMLPF construct. An independent samples Mest was used as the statistical method 
used to address this hypothesis. There were 435 of 551 respondents that had deployed 
within the three years prior to participating in this study. Participants that had not recently 
deployed consisted of 116 people. Only one of the 20 questions across the DOTMLPF 
construct resulted in statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. Question 19, 
within the leadership and education category, stated the following: Unit leaders are 
knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an operational context. The 
mean response of those that have recently deployed (M= 3.03) was greater than those 
that had not (M= 2.80), 5^49) = 2.07, (p =.039). Findings for Question 19 are reflected in 
Table 36. 
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Table 36 
H05: T-test results based on recent deployment experience (n= 435 Deployed and 116 Not 
Deployed) 
Question 19 
Deployed 
Not Deployed 
M 
3.03 
2.80 
SD 
1.05 
0.95 
t 
2.07 
df 
549 
P 
.039* 
Note. * = statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval. 
Summary 
There were several statistically significant findings associated with this study. 
Hoi, which addressed current organization, reflected two of 20 questions having statistical 
significance among the population, which included Question 13 (Training) and Question 
19 (Leadership and Education). H02, related to occupational field, indicated seven 
questions were statistically significant, which were Questions 8 and 9 (Organization), 
Questions 11, 12, and 13 (Training), Question 17 (Materiel), and Question 21 
(Personnel). H03, addressing different levels of experience, reflected six statistically 
significant findings, which were Questions 10, 11, and 12 (Training), Questions 22 and 
23 (Personnel), and Question 24 (Facilities). H04 identified statistical significance among 
11 of 20 questions among the different ranks within the population, which were Question 
7 (Doctrine), Questions 8 and 9 (Organization), Questions 10, 11,12, and 15 (Training), 
Questions 20, 21, and 23 (Personnel), and Question 24 (Facilities). Lastly, H05, which 
addressed recent deployment experience, only yielded one question of statistical 
significance, which was Question 19 (Leadership and Education). All statistics were 
conducted at the 95% confidence interval. 
Chapter V will provide a summary of the study and its findings. Conclusions will 
be provided based on statistically significant findings, which will be followed by 
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recommendations for improvement. In conclusion, Chapter V will provide 
recommendations for further research as a result of this study. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Within this study, survey research was conducted to collect quantitative data 
addressing the perspectives of command and control (C2) system users and those 
responsible for implementing and training C2 systems within the U.S. Marine Corps. 
Participants were asked 20 questions spanning across the Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) 
construct to determine if the population's views on current Marine Corps C2 identify any 
findings of statistical significance. In this chapter, a summary will be provided to develop 
an understanding of the study. Following the summary, conclusions will be provided 
based on the statistically significant findings across the research hypotheses. Based on the 
findings, recommendations for improvement and further research will be identified. 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to identify potential barriers to the effective 
employment of C2 systems to enhance warfighter readiness. To gain an objective 
understanding of current perspectives on Marine Corps C2, five research hypotheses 
guided this study. Hoi stated the following: There is no difference in the perception of the 
effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems between the Operating Forces and 
Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment across the DOTMLPF construct. 
This hypothesis aimed to determine if the two groups shared a common perspective on 
current C2 topics and issues. H02 stated the following: There is no relationship between 
occupational field and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 
systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Because various occupational fields work 
within the target population, it was important to seek input from occupational fields other 
than that of the infantry. H03 stated the following: There is no relationship between 
experience and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems 
across the DOTMLPF construct. This hypothesis aimed to identify if there were different 
perspectives across the population based on the individual's experience. H04 stated the 
following: There is no relationship between rank and the perception of the effective 
employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Typically, 
rank is associated with experience, but it was important to focus on rank in addition to 
experience because the Marine Corps has a relatively large number of personnel that are 
prior-enlisted before pursuing selection as a Warrant Officer or a Commissioned Officer. 
H05 stated the following: There is no relationship between recent deployment experience 
and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the 
DOTMLPF construct. This was included to determine if those that have recently 
deployed shared the same perspective as those that have not recently deployed based on 
job assignments, both past and present. 
There are several organizations involved in shaping C2 requirements including 
capability developers, those who manage acquisition programs, C2 system trainers, and 
users employing C2 systems during combat operations. The significance of this study is 
that decisions have an impact on resources. Time, money, and personnel must be 
considered as the Marine Corps moves forward in what appears to be a fiscally 
constrained environment. This study provides objective research to validate subjective 
feedback within recent after-action reports. 
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There were limitations related to this study, which included the following: 
1. This study focused specifically on C2 systems, which is one of many forms of IT 
used within the Armed Forces consisting of both hardware and software. 
2. Research was conducted focusing only on C2 system users and those that 
develop, train, and equip the Operating Forces within the U.S. Marine Corps. 
3. This study was focused on the effective employment of C2 systems used within 
the Combat Operations Center (COC) by the infantry community. 
These limitations provided scope to the study and narrowed the research to a specific 
focus area. The population of the study included the following: 
1. Active and Reserve Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) and Officers up 
to and including Colonels within the infantry occupational field; 
2. SNCOs and Officers of any occupational field that are now serving in an infantry 
unit or have recently served in an infantry unit; 
3. SNCOs and Officers within the Division/Marine Expeditionary Brigade/Marine 
Expeditionary Force staff familiar with C2 systems used in the infantry 
community; 
4. SNCOs, Officers, and Civilian Marines (GS12 - GS15) involved in the capability 
development, acquisition, and training of C2 systems from Headquarters, Marine 
Corps and the Supporting Establishment. 
Data were collected through a web-based survey that was sent via email to 
organizational leaders meeting the target population description and/or unit commanders 
of the Marines that met the population description. By including all of these individuals 
in the study, objective research was conducted by investigating all of those involved in 
shaping and using C2 systems in the Marine Corps. The total response rate within the 
population was approximately 11 %. Minimum sample sizes from the Operating Forces 
group and Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment group were 
exceeded, which provide statistical significance to these findings. 
Conclusions 
There were several statistically significant findings across the DOTMLPF 
construct addressing the five research hypotheses. While each question highlighted a 
current issue associated with Marine Corps C2, the practical significance of the findings 
is also addressed for each research hypothesis. 
Hypothesis^ focused on organization and stated the following: There is no 
difference in the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems 
between the Operating Forces and Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment 
across the DOTMLPF construct. Using a /-test, two questions reflected statistical 
significant differences among groups. 
Question 13 stated the following: C2 system training is adequately emphasized 
throughout the pre-deployment training program (PTP), including individual and 
collective training and mission rehearsal exercises. The mean response of the OPFOR 
(M= 3.18) was greater than that of HQMC/SE (M= 2.92), t(5A9) = 2.67, (p =.008). 
Related to training, the null hypothesis would be rejected. This indicates that the OPFOR 
felt that C2 system training is adequately emphasized during PTP to a greater degree than 
the HQMC/SE group, although neither group agreed with this statement. These results 
identify an opportunity for improvement regarding the emphasis placed on C2 system 
training throughout PTP. 
Question 19, related to leadership and education, stated the following: Unit 
leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an operational 
environment. The mean response of the OPFOR (M= 3.04) was greater than that of 
HQMC/SE (M= 2.83), f(549) = 2.29, (p -.023). Related to leadership and education, the 
null hypothesis would be rejected. This indicates that the OPFOR felt unit leaders are 
more knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems to a greater degree than 
HQMC/SE, although neither group collectively agreed with this statement. These results 
identify an opportunity for improvement regarding unit leaders' knowledge regarding C2 
system capabilities. 
Between the two groups (OPFOR and HQMC/SE), Hoi was rejected regarding 
Training and Leadership and Education. Although only two questions across the 
DOTMLPF construct reflected a statistically significant difference among group means, 
the Marine Corps must consider this effect as a potential barrier to the effective 
employment of C2 systems. Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting 
Establishment must maintain a constant awareness of the needs of the Operating Forces. 
At the same time, both groups must maintain realistic expectations of one another to 
enhance warfighter readiness. This feedback cycle will ensure a shared perception of the 
effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems between the Operating Forces and 
Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment. See Table 37, which identifies 
group means for statistically significant findings related to Hoi. 
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Table 37 
Hoi: Mean responses by organization for questions resulting in statistical significance 
Organization 
OPFOR 
HQMC/SE 
n 
385 
166 
Q13 
3.18 
2.92 
Q19 
3.04 
2.83 
Note. Total Sample = 551. OPFOR = Operating Forces; HQMC/SE = Headquarters, Marine Corps/ 
Supporting Establishment. Q13 = Training; Q19 = Leadership and Education. 
Hypothesiso2 focused on occupational field and stated the following: There is no 
relationship between occupational field and the perception of the effective employment 
of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Using one-way ANOVA, 
seven questions identified statistical significance among different occupational fields. 
Question 8, related to organization, stated the following: Current tables of 
equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The sample provided a 
neutral response to this statement (M= 2.61). Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the 
null hypothesis should be rejected related to organization, F(5, 545) = 3.33,p = .006. 
This means that the different occupational fields working within infantry units have 
different views regarding the ability of the equipment to enable effective C2. The infantry 
occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a neutral mean 
response of 2.50. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants 
and had a neutral mean response of 2.82. The intelligence occupational field (02XX) 
consisted of 51 participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.82. The logistics 
occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral mean response 
of 3.09. The communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and had a 
neutral mean response of 3.17. All other occupational fields consisted of 28 participants 
and had a neutral mean response of 2.75. Although all occupational fields had a neutral 
mean response to this question, no occupational field agreed with this statement. This 
suggests a need to evaluate current T/E related to C2 capabilities. Mean responses among 
different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38. 
Question 9, also related to organization, stated the following: Current tables of 
organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The sample slightly 
disagreed with this statement (M= 2.47), indicating a need to evaluate T/O structure 
within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be 
rejected related to organization, F(5, 545) = 3.18,/? = .008. This means that the different 
occupational fields working within infantry units have different views regarding the 
organizational structure enabling effective C2. The infantry occupational field (03XX) 
accounted for 404 participants and slightly disagreed with this statement (M- 2.39). 
Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and slightly 
disagreed with this statement (M= 2.45). The intelligence occupational field (02XX) 
consisted of 51 participants and had a neutral response to this statement (M- 2.75). The 
logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral 
response to this statement (M= 3.22). The communications occupational field consisted 
of 23 participants and slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.30). All other 
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a neutral response to this 
statement (M= 2.61). All occupational fields either slightly disagreed with this statement 
or had a neutral mean response to this question, which indicates that no occupational field 
agreed with this statement. This suggests a need to evaluate organizational structure 
related to effective C2. Mean responses among different occupational fields are reflected 
in Table 38. 
Within the Training category of questions, Question 11 stated the following: 
Current C2 system training adequately supports the effective employment of C2 systems 
in an operational context. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 
3.19), indicating a need to evaluate the effectiveness of C2 system training. Results of 
one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(5, 
545) = 2.77,p = .018. This means that the different occupational fields working within 
infantry units have different views regarding the ability of training to enable effective C2. 
The infantry occupational field (03 XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a neutral 
mean response of 3.21. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 
participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.00. The intelligence occupational field 
(02XX) consisted of 51 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.00. The 
logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and slightly agreed with 
this statement (M= 3.78). The communications occupational field consisted of 23 
participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.70. All other occupational fields 
consisted of 28 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.29. Other than the 
logistics occupational field, all other occupational fields had a neutral mean response to 
this statement, which raises question to why the logistics occupational field has a 
different perception regarding the ability of training to enable effective C2. Mean 
responses among different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38. 
Also within the Training category of questions, Question 12 stated the following: 
C2 system training should be mandated within the pre-deployment training program 
(PTP). The sample slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.19), indicating the 
perceived importance of C2 system training within infantry units. Results of one-way 
ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(5, 545) = 
2.47, p = .031. This means that the different occupational fields working within infantry 
units have different views regarding whether or not C2 system training should be 
mandatory. The infantry occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 participants and 
slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.14). Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 
18XX) consisted of 22 participants and strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.64). 
The intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 participants and slightly 
agreed with this statement (M= 4.02). The logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted 
of 23 participants and strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.65). The 
communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and slightly agreed with 
this statement (M= 4.30). All other occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and 
strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.50). All occupational fields agreed with this 
statement to some extent, which raises question as to whether or not Marines are able to 
attend C2 system training prior to deployment. Mean responses among different 
occupational fields are reflected in Table 38. 
Once again, within the Training category of questions, Question 13 stated the 
following: C2 system training is adequately emphasized throughout PTP, including 
individual and collective training and mission rehearsal exercises. The sample provided a 
neutral response to this statement (M= 3.10), indicating a need to assess the progression 
of C2 system training throughout various training venues. Results of one-way ANOVA 
indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(5, 545) = 3.40, 
p = .005. This means that the different occupational fields working within infantry units 
have different views regarding the emphasis placed on C2 system training within PTP. 
The infantry occupational field (03 XX) accounted for 404 participants and had a neutral 
mean response of 3.10. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 
participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.95. The intelligence occupational field 
(02XX) consisted of 51 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.25. The 
logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral mean 
response of 3.35. The communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and 
slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.30). All other occupational fields consisted 
of 28 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.32. The communications 
occupational field slightly disagreed with this statement, while all others had a neutral 
response. This means that none of the occupational fields represented feel that C2 system 
training is adequately emphasized during pre-deployment training. Mean responses 
among different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38. 
Within the Materiel category of questions, Question 17 stated the following: 
There is a widespread understanding of the capabilities of C2 systems used across the 
warfighting functions. The sample slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.44), 
indicating a need to evaluate C2 system use across the warfighting functions within 
infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be 
rejected related to materiel, F(5, 545) = 2.76, p = .018. This means that the different 
occupational fields working within infantry units have different views regarding the 
understanding of C2 system capabilities. The infantry occupational field (03XX) 
accounted for 404 participants and slightly disagreed with this statement (A/= 2.43). 
Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 18XX) consisted of 22 participants and slightly 
disagreed with this statement (M- 2.18). The intelligence occupational field (02XX) 
103 
consisted of 51 participants and slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.35). The 
logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral mean 
response of 2.91. The communications occupational field consisted of 23 participants and 
slightly disagreed with this statement (A/= 2.04). All other occupational fields consisted 
of 28 participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.79. All occupational fields either 
slightly disagreed or had a neutral response to this statement, but no single occupational 
field agreed with this statement. This indicates a perceived lack of understanding of the 
capabilities of C2 systems used across the warfighting functions. Mean responses among 
different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38. 
Lastly, within the Personnel category of questions, Question 21 stated the 
following: C2 system operator structure should be sourced from within the infantry 
occupational field (OCCFLD). The sample provided a neutral response to this statement 
(M= 3.01), indicating a need to determine if a C2 system operator OCCFLD is required 
and, if determined to be a requirement, where manpower would be sourced. Results of 
one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel, 
F(5, 545) = 2.44, p = .034. The infantry occupational field (03XX) accounted for 404 
participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.06. Other Combat Arms (08XX, 13XX, 
18XX) consisted of 22 participants and had a neutral mean response of 2.73. The 
intelligence occupational field (02XX) consisted of 51 participants and slightly disagreed 
with this statement (M= 2.49). The logistics occupational field (04XX) consisted of 23 
participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.09. The communications occupational 
field consisted of 23 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.30. All other 
occupational fields consisted of 28 participants and had a neutral mean response of 3.07. 
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All occupational fields either slightly disagreed with this statement or a neutral response, 
indicating disparity among occupational fields regarding where manpower should be 
sourced if a C2 operator occupational field were created. Mean responses among 
different occupational fields are reflected in Table 38. 
Among different occupational fields, H02 was rejected regarding Organization, 
Training, Materiel, and Personnel. Seven of 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct 
reflected statistically significant differences among group means. The Marine Corps must 
consider this effect as a potential barrier to the effective employment of C2 systems. 
Several occupational fields work within an infantry unit. The responsibility to train 
occupational fields rests with Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Supporting 
Establishment. If no occupational field is expressly tasked with the ownership of C2 
system employment, disparity among different occupational fields will continue to be 
present, which ultimately degrades warfighter readiness. See Table 38, which identifies 
group means for statistically significant findings related to H02. 
Table 38 
H02: Mean responses by OCCFLDfor questions resulting in statistical significance 
OCCFLD 
03XX (Infantry) 
Other Combat Arms 
02XX (Intelligence) 
04XX (Logistics) 
06XX (Communications) 
Other 
n 
404 
22 
51 
23 
23 
28 
Q8 
2.50 
2.82 
2.82 
3.09 
3.17 
2.75 
Q9 
2.39 
2.45 
2.75 
3.22 
2.30 
2.61 
Ql l 
3.21 
3.00 
3.00 
3.78 
2.70 
3.29 
Q12 
4.14 
4.64 
4.02 
4.65 
4.30 
4.50 
Q13 
3.10 
2.95 
3.25 
3.35 
2.30 
3.32 
Q17 
2.43 
2.18 
2.35 
2.91 
2.04 
2.79 
Q21 
3.06 
2.73 
2.49 
3.09 
3.30 
3.07 
Note. Total Sample = 551. Q8, Q9 = Organization; Ql 1, Q12, Q13 = Training; Q17 = Materiel; Q21 = 
Personnel. 
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Hypothesiso3 focused on experience and stated the following: There is no 
relationship between experience and the perception of the effective employment of 
Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Using one-way ANOVA, six 
questions identified statistical significance among different levels of experience. 
The first item reflecting statistical significance associated with different 
experience levels was Question 10, related to training. This question stated the following: 
C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment training. The sample 
strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.57), indicating the perceived importance of C2 
system training within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA; however, indicate the 
null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(4, 546) = 6.65, p < .001. This 
means that experience has an effect on how Marines view the importance of C2 system 
training during PTP. Participants having between zero and four years of experience 
consisted of six people, which strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.83). 
Participants having greater than four years and up to eight years of experience consisted 
of 112 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M- 4.23). Participants having 
greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63 
people, which strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.56). Participants having greater 
than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245 people, 
which strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.67). Participants with greater than 20 
years of experience consisted of 125 people, which strongly agreed with this statement 
(M= 4.68). Although all levels of experience agreed with this statement, the different 
experience level has an effect on the perception of importance of C2 system training 
during pre-deployment training. Mean responses among different experience levels are 
reflected in Table 39. 
Also within the Training category, Question 11 stated the following: Current C2 
system training adequately supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an 
operational context. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 3.19), 
indicating a need to evaluate C2 system training. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate 
the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(4, 546) = 4.75, p = .001. This 
indicates a difference in perception of the effectiveness of current C2 system training 
among different experience levels. Participants having between zero and four years of 
experience consisted of six people, which slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 
2.33). Participants having greater than four years and up to eight years of experience 
consisted of 112 people and had a neutral mean response of 3.03. Participants having 
greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63 
people and had a neutral mean response of 2.81. Participants having greater than 12 years 
of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 245 people and had a neutral 
mean response of 3.29. Participants with greater than 20 years of experience consisted of 
125 people and had a neutral mean response of 3.36. Regardless of experience, 
participants did not agree with this statement, further emphasizing the need for training 
program evaluation related to C2 system training. Mean responses among different 
experience levels are reflected in Table 39. 
Question 12, also within the Training category, stated the following: C2 system 
training should be mandated within the pre-deployment training program (PTP). The 
sample slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.19), indicating the perceived 
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importance of C2 system training within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA 
indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(4, 546) = 2.84, 
p = .024. This indicates a difference among different experience levels regarding whether 
or not C2 system training should be required when preparing to deploy. Participants 
having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people, which slightly 
agreed with this statement (M= 4.33). Participants having greater than four years and up 
to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people, which slightly agreed with this 
statement (M- 3.88). Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 
12 years of experience consisted of 63 people, which slightly agreed with this statement 
(M= 4.27). Participants having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of 
experience consisted of 245 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.25). 
Participants with greater than 20 years of experience consisted of 125 people, which 
slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.31). All experience levels agreed with this 
statement, which suggests the importance of C2 system training during pre-deployment 
training. Mean responses among different experience levels are reflected in Table 39. 
Within the Personnel category, Question 22 stated the following: Currently, COC 
personnel are adequately trained to perform their assigned billet prior to deployment. The 
sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 2.96), indicating a need to 
evaluate readiness of COC personnel within infantry units prior to deployment. Results of 
one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel, 
F(4, 546) = 2.48, p = .043. This indicates there is a different perception on readiness of 
C2 system users leading up to deployment depending on experience level. Participants 
having between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people, which slightly 
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agreed with this statement (M= 3.67). Participants having greater than four years and up 
to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people and had a neutral mean response of 
3.07. Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of 
experience consisted of 63 people and had a neutral mean response of 3.19. Participants 
having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience consisted of 
245 people and had a neutral mean response of 2.85. Participants with greater than 20 
years of experience consisted of 125 people and had a neutral mean response of 2.93. 
While the group with the least amount of experience slightly agreed with this statement, 
all others provided a neutral response. This suggests a need to further explore the 
readiness of Marines and their ability to conduct C2 prior to deployment. Mean responses 
among different experience levels are reflected in Table 39. 
Also within the Personnel category, Question 23 stated the following: COC staff 
members across the warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to 
conduct PTP with other unit members. The sample provided a neutral response to this 
statement (M= 2.67), indicating a need to evaluate the timely assignment of personnel 
within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be 
rejected related to personnel, F(4, 546) = 2.69, p = .030. This means that there is disparity 
across different experience levels regarding unit readiness as a result of manpower being 
assigned in a timely manner. Participants having between zero and four years of 
experience consisted of six people and had a neutral mean response of 3.00. Participants 
having greater than four years and up to eight years of experience consisted of 112 people 
and had a neutral mean response of 2.80. Participants having greater than eight years of 
experience and up to 12 years of experience consisted of 63 people and had a neutral 
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mean response of 2.90. Participants having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 
20 years of experience consisted of 245 people and had a neutral mean response of 2.64. 
Participants with greater than 20 years of experience consisted of 125 people, which 
slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.46). Those with the most experience 
disagreed with this statement, while all others provided a neutral response. This suggests 
a problem area that must be further explored to ensure warfighter and unit readiness prior 
to deployment. Mean responses among different experience levels are reflected in Table 
39. 
Question 24, within the Facilities category, was the last question that reflected 
statistical significance based on different levels of experience. This question stated the 
following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately supports 
effective C2. The sample slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.53), indicating 
Marines within infantry units generally have a positive perception of COC equipment. 
Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to 
facilities, F(4, 546) = 2.64, p = .033. These results indicate variance among different 
levels of experience affecting perceptions of current COC equipment. Participants having 
between zero and four years of experience consisted of six people, which slightly agreed 
with this statement (M= 4.17). Participants having greater than four years and up to eight 
years of experience consisted of 112 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M 
= 3.71). Participants having greater than eight years of experience and up to 12 years of 
experience consisted of 63 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.59). 
Participants having greater than 12 years of experience and up to 20 years of experience 
consisted of 245 people and had a neutral mean response of 3.48. Participants with 
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greater than 20 years of experience consisted of 125 people and had a neutral mean 
response of 3.39. This question, in particular, resulted in a reciprocal relationship 
between mean response and experience. Either the most senior participants truly believe 
that the COC equipment needs improvement or they do not fully understand its 
capabilities. Mean responses among different experience levels are reflected in Table 39. 
Among different levels of experience, H03 was rejected regarding Training, 
Personnel, and Facilities. Six of 20 questions across the DOTMLPF construct reflected 
statistically significant differences among group means. The Marine Corps must consider 
this effect as a potential barrier to the effective employment of C2 systems. Disparity 
among different levels of experience may be due to a generation gap, which can impact 
technological understanding. Additionally, senior leaders not required to use current C2 
systems earlier in their career may question the need for the technology. It is not always 
the user's desire to employ C2 systems; C2 system employment is often due to a reporting 
requirement from Higher Headquarters (HHQ). Technological advance is unlikely to 
slow down, but it is very likely that it will become more complex. This effect must be 
considered when significant decisions are made shaping future Marine Corps C2 
capabilities. See Table 39, which identifies group means for statistically significant 
findings related to H03. 
Hypothesiso4 focused on rank and stated the following: There is no relationship 
between rank and the perception of the effective employment of Marine Corps C2 
systems across the DOTMLPF construct. Using one-way ANOVA, eleven questions 
identified statistical significance among different levels of experience. 
I l l 
6 
112 
63 
245 
125 
4.83 
4.23 
4.56 
4.67 
4.68 
2.33 
3.03 
2.81 
3.29 
3.36 
4.33 
3.88 
4.27 
4.25 
4.31 
3.67 
3.07 
3.19 
2.85 
2.93 
3.00 
2.80 
2.90 
2.64 
2.46 
4.17 
3.71 
3.59 
3.48 
3.39 
Table 39 
H03: Mean responses by experience for questions resulting in statistical significance 
Experience n Q10 Qll Q12 Q22 Q23 Q24 
0 - 4 Years 
>4 - 8 Years 
>8 - 12 Years 
>12 -20 Years 
>20 Years 
Note. Total Sample = 551. Q10, Ql 1, Q12 = Training; Q22, Q23 = Personnel; Q24 = Facilities. 
The first item reflecting statistical significance associated with different 
experience levels was Question 7, related to doctrine. This question stated the following: 
Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2 employment practices witnessed in current 
operations. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 2.74), 
indicating indifference regarding the need to determine if Marine Corps doctrine should 
be updated based on current operations. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null 
hypothesis should be rejected related to doctrine, F(3, 547) = 4.67,/? = .003. This 
indicates variance among different ranks regarding doctrine accurately reflecting C2 
employment practices demonstrated in current operations. Staff Non-Commissioned 
Officers (SNCOs) consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.01. 
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.63. 
Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.62. 
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a neutral group 
mean of 2.74. All ranks provided a neutral response to this statement. The Marine Corps 
must determine if current operational concepts should be adopted into doctrine, or 
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dismiss current operations as being isolated to the current mission and unlikely to be 
repeated in the future. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40. 
Within the Organization category, Question 8 reflected statistical significance 
among the different ranks. This question stated the following: Current tables of 
equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The sample provided a 
neutral response to this statement (M= 2.61), indicating indifference regarding the 
current T/E within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null 
hypothesis should be rejected related to organization, F(3, 547) = 4.49, p = .004. This 
indicates variance among different ranks regarding the ability of equipment to support 
effective employment of C2 systems. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a neutral 
group mean of 2.79. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral 
group mean of 2.66. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people, which slightly 
disagreed with this statement (M= 2.38). Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted 
of 27 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.89. Field Grade Officers slightly 
disagreed with this statement, while all others provided a neutral response. Regardless, no 
single rank-group agreed with this statement presenting a need to evaluate current T/E 
related to C2 capabilities. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 
40. 
Also within the Organization category, Question 9 reflected statistical 
significance among the different ranks. This question stated the following: Current tables 
of organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 systems. The sample 
slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.47), indicating a need to evaluate T/O 
structure within infantry units. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis 
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should be rejected related to organization, F(3, 547) = 7.08,/? < .001. This indicates 
variance among different ranks regarding the organizational structure of units supporting 
the effective employment of C2. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group 
mean of 2.72. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group 
mean of 2.52. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people, which slightly disagreed 
with this statement (M= 2.19). Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 
people and had a neutral group mean of 2.70. With the exception of Field Grade Officers, 
who slightly disagreed with this statement, all others provided a neutral response. This 
suggests a further need to examine organizational structure to effectively employ C2 
systems. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40. 
Within the Training category, four of six questions reflected statistical 
significance among the different ranks. Question 10 was the first item. This question 
stated the following: C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment 
training. The sample strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.57), indicating a need to 
evaluate the importance of C2 system training within infantry units. Results of one-way 
ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(3, 547) = 
6.11, p < .001. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding the importance of 
C2 system training during pre-deployment training. SNCOs consisted of 149 people, 
which strongly agreed with this statement (M- 4.57). Company Grade Officers consisted 
of 186 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.39). Field Grade Officers 
consisted of 189 people, which strongly agreed with this statement (M= 4.74). 
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people, which strongly agreed with 
this statement (M~ 4.63). All ranks agreed with this statement, which suggests a need to 
114 
develop a plan to ensure units are adequately prepared to conduct C2 prior to 
deployment. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40. 
Question 11 was the next item within the Training category reflecting statistical 
significance. This question stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately 
supports the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational context. The sample 
provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 3.19), indicating a need to evaluate C2 
system training. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be 
rejected related to training, F(3, 547) = 5.60, p = .001. This indicates variance among 
different ranks regarding the effectiveness of current C2 system training. SNCOs 
consisted of 149 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.50). Company 
Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.03. Field 
Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.12. 
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a neutral group 
mean of 3.11. With the exception of SNCOs, who slightly agreed with this statement, all 
other ranks provided a neutral response to this statement, suggesting a need to implement 
training program evaluation related to C2 system training. Using C2 systems in a 
classroom is not the same as using them during combat operations. Mean responses 
among different ranks are reflected in Table 40. 
Question 12 was the next item within the Training category reflecting statistical 
significance. This question stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated 
within the pre-deployment training program (PTP). The sample slightly agreed with this 
statement (M= 4.19), indicating a need to evaluate the emphasis placed on C2 system 
training within PTP. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be 
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rejected related to training, F(3, 547) = 4.96,p - .002. This indicates variance among 
different ranks regarding mandated C2 system training during pre-deployment training. 
SNCOs consisted of 149 people, which slightly agreed with this statement (A/= 4.43). 
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people, which slightly agreed with this 
statement (M= 4.00). Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people, which slightly agreed 
with this statement (M= 4.15). Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 
people, which slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.48). All ranks agreed with this 
statement, indicating the perceived degree of importance of C2 system training during 
pre-deployment. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40. 
Question 15 was the last item within the Training category reflecting statistical 
significance. This question stated the following: Marines are knowledgeable on the C2 
Training Continuum. The sample slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.31), 
indicating a need to evaluate what training is provided at multiple venues. Results of one-
way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to training, F(3, 547) 
= 3.02, p = .029. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding the C2 Training 
Continuum, which establishes a progression through multiple training venues. SNCOs 
consisted of 149 people, which slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.48). 
Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people, which slightly disagreed with this 
statement (M= 2.17). Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people, which slightly 
disagreed with this statement (M= 2.30). Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted 
of 27 people, which slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.41). The C2 Training 
Continuum outlines what training is provided by what venue. If Marines are not familiar 
with this construct, it is unlikely they will attend recommended training during pre-
deployment training. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in Table 40. 
Within the Personnel category, there were three questions indicating statistical 
significance. Question 20 was the first item within the personnel category reflecting 
statistical significance. This question stated the following: A primary MOS should be 
established to provide dedicated C2 system operators. The sample provided a neutral 
response to this statement (M= 3.28), indicating Marines are undecided regarding the 
need for a C2 system operator MOS. Results of one-way ANOVA indicate the null 
hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel, F(3, 547) = 3.02, p = .029. This 
indicates variance among different ranks regarding whether or not a C2 operator MOS 
should be established. SNCOs consisted of 149 people, which slightly agreed with this 
statement (M= 3.54). Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral 
group mean of 3.01. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral 
group mean of 3.30. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and 
had a neutral group mean of 3.44. With the exception of SNCOs, who slightly agreed 
with this statement, all other ranks provided a neutral response, indicating a need to 
further explore the need to establish a C2 operator occupational field. Mean responses 
among different ranks are reflected in Table 40. 
The next item reflecting statistical significance in the Personnel category was 
Question 21. This question stated the following: C2 system operator structure should be 
sourced from within the infantry occupational field (OCCFLD). The sample provided a 
neutral response to this statement (M= 3.01), indicating Marines are undecided regarding 
the source of manpower if a C2 operator MOS were established. Results of one-way 
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ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel, F(3, 547) = 
4.52, p = .004. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding what occupational 
field should provide the manpower to establish a C2 system operator MOS. SNCOs 
consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.22. Company Grade Officers 
consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.05. Field Grade Officers 
consisted of 189 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.76. Government Civilians 
(GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people and had a neutral group mean of 3.26. Neutral 
responses across the ranks indicate indifference regarding the source of manpower if a C2 
operator occupational field were to be established. If the Marine Corps determines an 
occupational field is required, manpower will likely present challenges. Mean responses 
among different ranks are reflected in Table 40. 
The last item reflecting statistical significance in the Personnel category was 
Question 23. This question stated the following: COC staff members across the 
warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to conduct PTP with other 
unit members. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M- 2.67), 
indicating indifference regarding the timely assignment of COC personnel. Results of 
one-way ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to personnel, 
F(3, 547) = 4.12, p = .007. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding the 
assignment of the right personnel at the right time to conduct pre-deployment training 
with an assigned unit. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group mean of 
2.67. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people and had a neutral group mean of 
2.84. Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral group mean of 2.55. 
Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people, which slightly disagreed 
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with this statement (M= 2.22). None of the ranks agreed with this statement, which 
suggests a need to find resolution to this perceived problem. Mean responses among 
different ranks are reflected in Table 40. 
One item in the Facilities category reflected statistical significance. Question 24 
stated the following: Current combat operation center (COC) equipment adequately 
supports effective C2. The sample slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.53), 
indicating Marines are generally positive regarding COC equipment. Results of one-way 
ANOVA indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected related to facilities, F(3, 547) = 
4.15, p = .006. This indicates variance among different ranks regarding the effectiveness 
of current COC facilities. SNCOs consisted of 149 people and had a neutral group mean 
of 3.44. Company Grade Officers consisted of 186 people, which slightly agreed with this 
statement (M= 3.70). Field Grade Officers consisted of 189 people and had a neutral 
group mean of 3.40. Government Civilians (GS12 - GS15) consisted of 27 people, which 
slightly agreed with this statement {M= 3.70). Two groups slightly agreed, while the 
other two groups provided a neutral response. Ideally, all ranks would agree with this 
statement. This indicates either a lack of understanding of COC capabilities or a potential 
opportunity for improvement. Mean responses among different ranks are reflected in 
Table 40. 
Among different ranks, H04 was rejected regarding Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Personnel, and Facilities. Eleven of 20 questions across the DOTMLPF 
construct reflected statistically significant differences among group means. The Marine 
Corps must consider this effect as a potential barrier to the effective employment of C2 
systems. Disparity among different ranks may be due to similar reasons expressed within 
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different levels of experience. C2 system operators tend to be relatively junior Marines, 
while those that interpret the meaning of the information provided by C2 systems are 
typically Staff Non-commissioned Officers and above. Disparity among ranks may be 
explained by the different billets associated with C2 system employment. Decision-
makers must think through the eyes of the C2 system user. Understanding this effect 
during decision-making can impact future C2 capabilities. See Table 40, which identifies 
group means for statistically significant findings related to H04. 
Table 40 
H04: Mean responses by rank for questions resulting in statistical significance 
n 
Q7 
Q8 
Q9 
Q10 
Qll 
Q12 
Q15 
Q20 
Q21 
Q23 
Q24 
Staff Non-Commissioned 
Officers 
149 
3.01 
2.79 
2.72 
4.57 
3.50 
4.43 
2.48 
3.54 
3.22 
2.67 
3.44 
Company Grade 
Officers 
186 
2.63 
2.66 
2.52 
4.39 
3.03 
4.00 
2.17 
3.01 
3.05 
2.84 
3.70 
Field Grade 
Officers 
189 
2.62 
2.38 
2.19 
4.74 
3.12 
4.15 
2.30 
3.30 
2.76 
2.55 
3.40 
Government Civilians 
(GS12-GS15) 
27 
2.74 
2.89 
2.70 
4.63 
3.11 
4.48 
2.41 
3.44 
3.26 
2.22 
3.70 
Note. Total Sample = 551. Q7 = Doctrine; Q8, Q9 = Doctrine; Q10, Ql 1, Q12, Q15 = Training; Q20, Q21, 
Q23 = Personnel; Q24 = Facilities. 
Hypothesises focused on recent deployment experience and stated the following: 
There is no relationship between recent deployment experience and the perception of the 
effective employment of Marine Corps C2 systems across the DOTMLPF construct. 
Using a /-test, just one question reflected statistical significant differences among groups. 
Question 19, within the Leadership and Education category, stated the following: 
Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an operational 
context. The mean response of those that have recently deployed (M= 3.03) was greater 
than those that had not (M= 2.80), t(549) = 2.07, (p =.039). Related to leadership and 
education, the null hypothesis would be rejected. This indicates variance among those 
that have recently deployed and those that have not recently deployed regarding unit 
leaders' awareness of C2 system capabilities. Both groups provided a neutral response to 
this statement, suggesting an opportunity for improvement, which could most likely be 
realized through a training course targeted toward unit leaders. 
Among the two groups (recently deployed and not recently deployed), H05 was 
rejected regarding Leadership and Education. Although only one of 20 questions across 
the DOTMLPF construct reflected statistically significant differences among group 
means, the Marine Corps must consider this effect as a potential barrier to the effective 
employment of C2 systems. Any disparity among those that have recently deployed and 
those that had not recently deployed must be overcome. Headquarters, Marine Corps and 
the Supporting Establishment must continually adapt to support current warfighter needs 
within fiscal constraints. Marine Corps leadership must determine what feedback from 
forward-deployed units requires corrective action and adapt its training and education 
programs accordingly. Understanding this effect can positively impact warfighter 
readiness for the next unit sent into harm's way. See Table 41, which identifies group 
means for statistically significant findings related to H05. 
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Table 41 
H05: Mean responses by recent deployment experience for questions resulting in statistical 
significance 
n Q19 
Deployed 435 3.03 
Not Deployed 116 2.80 
Note. Total Sample = 551. Q19 = Leadership and Education. 
Recommendations 
As a result of this study, there are several recommendations for improvement 
across the DOTMLPF construct. The descriptive data compiled within this study suggests 
potential opportunities for improvement. Statistically significant variance identified 
among different demographics on several issues indicate different perceptions of the 
effective employment of C2 systems across the five research hypotheses. 
Recommendations for improvement will be provided based on each research hypothesis, 
which will be followed by recommendations for further research. 
Hypothesisoi addressed different perspectives among the C2 system users within 
the Operating Forces and those that implement and train C2 systems from Headquarters, 
Marine Corps and the Supporting Establishment. The null hypothesis was rejected related 
to Training (Question 13) and Leadership and Education (Question 19). 
1. Question 13 stated the following: C2 system training is adequately emphasized 
throughout PTP, including individual and collective training and mission rehearsal 
exercises. Although the /-test resulted in a statistically significant difference, both groups 
had a neutral mean response, which indicates an opportunity for improvement. The first 
recommendation for improvement, related to Training, is for the Marine Corps to 
determine if C2 system training is, in fact, adequately emphasized during pre-deployment 
training. To make this determination, the Manne Corps must implement training program 
evaluation across the C2 Training Continuum to ensure current training meets its 
intended objectives. While doing so, it is of vital importance to include representatives 
from the Operating Forces and Headquarters, Marine Corps/Supporting Establishment 
when shaping the evaluation. By including representation from both groups, the Marine 
Corps will improve its training programs and gain insight into its true impact on combat 
operations. 
2. Question 19 stated the following: Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to 
best employ C2 systems in an operational environment. Although the /-test resulted in a 
statistically significant difference, both groups had a neutral mean response, which 
indicates an opportunity for improvement. The second recommendation for improvement, 
related to Leadership and Education, is for Marine Corps leadership to consider 
developing a training course for unit leaders focused on C2 system capabilities. By 
developing a course suitable for unit leaders the Marine Corps may be able to better-
capitalize on the capabilities provided by current C2 systems. 
Hypothesiso2 addressed different perspectives on effective employment of C2 
systems among different occupational fields. The null hypothesis was rejected related to 
Organization (Questions 8, 9), Training (Questions 11, 12, 13), Materiel (Question 17), 
and Personnel (Question 21). Question 13 (Training) was previously addressed. The 
remaining questions reflecting statistical significance within H02 are addressed below. 
3. Question 8 stated the following: Current tables of equipment (T/E) support the 
effective employment of C2 systems. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a 
statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The sample 
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provided a neutral response (M= 2.61), indicating an opportunity for improvement. The 
third recommendation for improvement, related to Organization, is for Marine Corps 
leadership to evaluate current unit Tables of Equipment (T/E) to determine if the 
Operating Forces are properly equipped to exercise C2. 
4. Question 9 stated the following: Current tables of organization (T/O) support the 
effective employment of C2 systems. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a 
statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The sample 
slightly disagreed with this statement (M= 2.47), indicating an opportunity for 
improvement. The fourth recommendation for improvement, related to Organization, is 
for Marine Corps leadership to evaluate current unit Tables of Organization (T/O) to 
determine if the Operating Forces are structured appropriately across the various 
occupational fields within infantry units. 
5. Question 11 stated the following: Current C2 system training adequately supports 
the effective employment of C2 systems in an operational environment. Results of one-
way ANOVA identified a statistically significant difference among different occupational 
fields. The sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 3.19), indicating an 
opportunity for improvement. The fifth recommendation for improvement, related to 
Training, is for Marine Corps leadership to evaluate C2 system training provided at all 
appropriate training venues, which is related to the previous recommendation for training 
program evaluation. 
6. Question 12 stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated within 
the pre-deployment training program (PTP). Results of one-way ANOVA identified a 
statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The sample 
slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.19). The sixth recommendation for 
improvement, related to Training, is for Marine Corps leadership to ensure that all 
relevant personnel, regardless of occupational field, are receiving appropriate training. 
7. Question 17 stated the following: There is a widespread understanding of the 
capabilities of C2 systems across the warfighting functions. Results of one-way ANOVA 
identified a statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The 
sample slightly disagreed with this statement (M- 2.44). The seventh recommendation 
for improvement, related to Materiel, is for Marine Corps leadership to determine the 
meaning of this variance among different occupational fields and determine why the 
Marines disagreed with this statement. 
8. Question 21 stated the following: C2 operator structure should be sourced from 
within the infantry occupational field. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a 
statistically significant difference among different occupational fields. The sample 
provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 3.01). The eighth recommendation for 
improvement, related to Personnel, is for Marine Corps leadership to determine if a C2 
system operator should be established, and, if so, who will provide manpower to support 
this requirement. 
Hypothesiso3 addressed different perspectives on effective employment of C2 
systems among different levels of experience. The null hypothesis was rejected related to 
Training (Questions 10, 11, 12), Personnel (Question 22, 23), and Facilities (Question 
24). Question 11 (Training) was previously addressed. The remaining questions reflecting 
statistical significance within H03 are addressed below. 
9. Question 10 stated the following: C2 system training is an important component 
of pre-deployment training. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a statistically 
significant difference among different levels of experience. The sample strongly agreed 
with this statement ( M - 4.57). The ninth recommendation for improvement, related to 
Training, is for Marine Corps leadership to continue to pursue a comprehensive C2 
Training Continuum throughout individual and collective training venues. 
10. Question 12 stated the following: C2 system training should be mandated within 
the pre-deployment training program (PTP). Results of one-way ANOVA identified a 
statistically significant difference among different levels of experience. The sample 
slightly agreed with this statement (M= 4.19). The tenth recommendation for 
improvement, related to Training, is for Marine Corps leadership to ensure C2 system 
operators attend appropriate training courses, which is related to the previous 
recommendation for a comprehensive C2 Training Continuum. 
11. Question 22 stated the following: Currently, COC personnel are adequately 
trained to perform their assigned billet prior to deployment. Results of one-way ANOVA 
identified a statistically significant difference among different levels of experience. The 
sample provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 2.96). The eleventh 
recommendation for improvement, related to Personnel, is for Marine Corps leadership to 
ensure C2 system operators are properly trained prior to deployment, which is related to 
the previous recommendation for a comprehensive C2 Training Continuum. 
12. Question 23 stated the following: COC staff members across the warfighting 
functions are assigned to a unit with enough time to conduct PTP with other unit 
members. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a statistically significant difference 
among different levels of experience. The sample provided a neutral response to this 
statement (M- 2.67). The twelfth recommendation for improvement, related to 
Personnel, is for Marine Corps leadership to evaluate its manpower assignment system to 
ensure units are properly sourced with appropriate personnel in a timely manner. 
13. Question 24 stated the following: Current combat operations center (COC) 
equipment adequately supports effective C2. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a 
statistically significant difference among different levels of experience. The sample 
slightly agreed with this statement (M= 3.53). The thirteenth recommendation for 
improvement, related to Facilities, is for Marine Corps leadership to continue to ensure 
COC equipment meets warfighter needs and attempt to understand why variance among 
different levels of experience exists related to this topic. 
Hypothesises addressed different perspectives on effective employment of C2 
systems among different ranks. The null hypothesis was rejected related to Doctrine 
(Question 7), Organization (Questions 8, 9), Training (Questions 10, 11, 12, 15), 
Personnel (Question 20, 21, 23), and Facilities (Question 24). Questions 8 and 9 
(Organization), Questions 10,11, and 12 (Training), Questions 21 and 23 (Personnel), 
and Question 24 (Facilities) were previously addressed. The remaining questions 
reflecting statistical significance within H04 are addressed below. 
14. Question 7 stated the following: Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2 
employment practices witnessed in current operations. Results of one-way ANOVA 
identified a statistically significant difference among different ranks. The sample 
provided a neutral response to this statement (M= 2.74). The fourteenth recommendation 
for improvement, related to Doctrine, is for Marine Corps leadership to determine if 
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doctrine is in need of updating. Current operations may or may not be the way that the 
Marine Corps operates in the future; however, this needs to be determined to ensure that 
the associated doctrinal publications maintain currency and relevance. 
15. Question 15 stated the following: Marines are knowledgeable on the C2 Training 
Continuum. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a statistically significant difference 
among different ranks. The sample slightly disagreed this statement (M= 2.31). The 
fifteenth recommendation for improvement, related to Training, is for Marine Corps 
leadership to continue to develop a comprehensive C2 Training Continuum and ensure 
unit commanders understand what training is available. This is related to several previous 
recommendations. 
16. Question 20 stated the following: A primary MOS should be established to 
provide dedicated C2 system operators. Results of one-way ANOVA identified a 
statistically significant difference among different ranks. The sample provided a neutral 
response to this statement (M= 3.28). The sixteenth recommendation for improvement, 
related to Personnel, is for Marine Corps leadership to continue to evaluate the need for a 
dedicated C2 system operator occupational field, which is related to a previous 
recommendation. If this is validated as a requirement, sourcing manpower will likely be 
problematic. Regardless, it is a worthwhile effort to develop alternative courses of action 
and present them to senior decision-makers. 
Hypothesises addressed different perspectives on effective employment of C2 
systems among those that have recently deployed and those that have not. The null 
hypothesis was rejected related to Leadership and Education (Question 19). Results of the 
Mest indicated that those that had recently deployed responded with a higher group mean 
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(M= 3.03) than those who had not recently deployed (M= 2.80); however, both result in 
a neutral response. Question 19 was previously addressed within Hoi . 
Recommendations for Further Research 
As indicated by the literature, IT changes at a rapid rate. Implementing the same 
acquisition process regardless of functional area introduces challenges due to different 
rates of technological advance. If technology outpaces the procurement process used to 
implement a new technology, the solution may be dated prior to initial fielding to the user 
(Gibbs, 2009). By developing an Information System Strategy, the Marine Corps could 
better-define its desired capabilities (Pollais, 2003), which would provide a proactive 
posture against potential threats in future conflicts. Additionally, this may provide insight 
into improved business practices associated with the procurement of new IT solutions and 
how this may lead to more holistic acquisition practices (Powner, 2004). Although 
current C2 systems were fielded at different times and under different warfighting 
functions, they are used in real-world operations as the collective C2 system of systems. 
For that reason, they must be managed this way from a capability perspective. As stated 
by Powner (2004), building this portfolio requires a detailed information system strategy 
that will span the test of time. Of course this will change with technological development 
and enemy threats, but it will serve as a starting point to ensure objectives are met. The 
Marine Corps could benefit from further research evaluating the establishment of an 
Information System Strategy. 
Further research is recommended to address the meaning of the variance found in 
this study. Variance among different occupational fields, levels of experience, and 
different ranks bring to question the training and education associated with C2. Because 
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this subject is resource intensive, the Marine Corps should continue to refine how it 
conducts C2, the tools used to exercise C2, and the training associated with enabling 
successful C2. Leadership will want to know the return-on-investment (ROI) of these 
investments in terms of resources beyond dollars (Serafeimidis & Smithson, 2000). 
Facing times of fiscal limitations, addressing the meaning of the variance found among 
different demographics is critical to ensuring successful C2 in future conflicts. 
Across different demographics, variance was consistently reflected regarding the 
establishment of a C2 operator occupational field. There appears to be some confusion on 
who, exactly, is expected to do what regarding C2 system employment. Marine Corps 
training is centered on two things, which include occupational fields, and to a lesser 
degree, unit type. Roles must be clearly defined when implementing IT to ensure training 
requirements are properly addressed (Pineda, 2010). Without clear ownership of C2 
system administration and employment, the Marine Corps will likely continue to 
experience similar feedback within unit after-action reports. If no occupational field 
expressly owns C2, training gaps are likely to continue. Praslova (2010) suggests training 
must be evaluated to provide results. Variance across different demographics suggests 
disparity related to this topic. Evaluation of current training could provide insight to 
shape future decisions on this matter. Further research is recommended to explore the 
option of establishing an occupational field to focus on C2 system employment. 
Lastly, further research is recommended to conduct a similar study throughout the 
Marine Corps. Every occupational field and warfighting function throughout the Marine 
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducts C2; therefore, if this study were conducted 
across the MAGTF, the Marine Corps may gain greater insight into this functional area. 
Conducting this study across the MAGTF could potentially enhance the performance of 
C2 system employment throughout the Marine Corps. This study focused on the infantry 
community. Conducting this study throughout the Marine Corps will provide a 
comprehensive study that could serve as a significant benefit to resource planning as the 
Marine Corps faces a very difficult fiscal climate. 
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APPENDIX A 
Survey Instrument (Original) 
Purpose: 
The purpose of this survey is to collect data to identify potential barriers to the effective 
employment of Marine Corps command and control systems to enhance warfighter 
readiness. 
Instructions: 
There are 25 questions on this survey. The first five questions address demographic 
information. Please answer based on your current billet assignment. 
1. What is your current rank? 
a. SSgt - MGySgt/SgtMaj (E-6 - E-9) 
b. W01-Cap t (WO- l -0 -3 ) 
c. Maj - Col (0-4 - 0-6) 
d. GS-09-GS-12 
e. GS-13-GS-15 
2. How long have you served as a Marine and/or Civilian Marine? 
a. 0 - 4 Years 
b. 5 - 8 Years 
c. 9 - 1 2 Years 
d. 13-20 Years 
e. Over 20 Years 
3. What is (what was) your primary Occupational Field (OCCFLD) while in 
uniform? 
a. Fill in the blank 
4. Have you been forward-deployed in support of real-world operations within the 
last 36 months? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
5. Which organization best describes your current billet assignment? 
a. Operating Forces (Active Duty) 
b. MARFORRES 
c. HQMC 
d. Supporting Establishment 
e. Resident PME Student 
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Instructions: 
The remaining questions of the survey have been developed along the DOTMLPF 
construct, consisting of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel, and Facilities. All statements will have five different options. If 
you strongly disagree with the statement, select 1. If you slightly disagree, select 2. If you 
are neutral, or indifferent, select 3. If you slightly agree, select 4. If you strongly agree 
with the statement, select 5. Please provide the best answer based on your knowledge of 
Marine Corps C2 systems. 
DOCTRINE 
6. Current Marine Corps doctrine adequately supports the effective employment of 
USMC C2 systems. 
7. Doctrinal publications support the execution of C2 during current operations. 
ORGANIZATION 
8. Current tables of equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 
systems. 
9. Current tables of organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 
systems. 
TRAINING 
10. C2 system training is important relative to other pre-deployment training. 
11. Current C2 system training supports the effective employment of C2 systems in 
an operational environment. 
12. C2 system training should be mandated in the pre-deployment training program 
(PTP). 
13. C2 system training is emphasized throughout PTP, including individual and 
collective training and mission rehearsal exercises. 
14. Marines are generally knowledgeable of what C2 system training is available in 
CONUS. 
15. Marines know where to go to receive training on C2 systems. 
MATERIEL 
16. Current C2 systems adequately support current operations. 
17. There is a widespread understanding of the capabilities of C2 systems across the 
warfighting functions. 
LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION 
18. C2 system training should be incorporated into professional military education 
(PME) programs. 
19. Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an 
operational environment. 
PERSONNEL 
20. A primary MOS should be established to provide dedicated C2 system operators. 
21. The Marine Corps should give up infantry Marines to fulfill personnel 
requirements to generate a C2 system operator MOS. 
22. Currently, COC personnel are adequately trained to perform their assigned billet 
prior to deployment. 
23. COC staff members across the warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with 
enough time to conduct PTP with other unit members. 
FACILITIES 
24. The current combat operations center (COC) equipment adequately supports the 
effective employment of C2 systems. 
25. Units are generally proficient in the installation and operation of the COC prior to 
deployment. 
Thank you for participating in this survey. 
APPENDIX B 
Survey Instrument (Revised) 
Purpose: 
The purpose of this survey is to collect data to identify potential barriers to the effective 
employment of Marine Corps command and control systems to enhance warfighter 
readiness. 
Instructions: 
There are 25 questions on this survey. The first five questions address demographic 
information. Please answer based on your current billet assignment. 
1. What is your current rank? 
a. SSgt - MGySgt/SgtMaj (E-6 - E-9) 
b. WOl - Capt (WO-1 - 0-3) 
c. Maj - Col (0-4 - 0-6) 
d. GS09-GS12 
e. GS13-GS15 
2. How long have you served as a Marine and/or Civilian Marine? 
a. 0 - 4 Years 
b. > 4 - 8 Years 
c. > 8 - 1 2 Years 
d. >12-20 Years 
e. >20 Years 
3. What is (what was) your primary Occupational Field (OCCFLD) while in 
uniform? 
a. Fill in the blank 
4. Have you been forward-deployed in support of real-world operations within the 
last 36 months? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
5. Which organization best describes your current billet assignment? 
a. Operating Forces (Active Duty) 
b. MARFORRES 
c. HQMC 
d. Supporting Establishment 
e. Resident PME Student 
Instructions: 
The remaining questions of the survey have been developed along the DOTMLPF 
construct, consisting of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel, and Facilities. All statements will have five different options. If 
you strongly disagree with the statement, select 1. If you slightly disagree, select 2. If you 
are neutral, or indifferent, select 3. If you slightly agree, select 4. If you strongly agree 
with the statement, select 5. Please provide the best answer based on your knowledge of 
Marine Corps C2 systems. 
DOCTRINE 
6. Current Marine Corps doctrine provides sufficient guidance to effectively employ 
C2 systems. 
7. Marine Corps doctrine accurately reflects C2 employment practices witnessed in 
current operations. 
ORGANIZATION 
8. Current tables of equipment (T/E) support the effective employment of C2 
systems. 
9. Current tables of organization (T/O) support the effective employment of C2 
systems. 
TRAINING 
10. C2 system training is an important component of pre-deployment training. 
11. Current C2 system training adequately supports the effective employment of C2 
systems in an operational environment. 
12. C2 system training should be mandated within the pre-deployment training 
program (PTP). 
13. C2 system training is adequately emphasized throughout PTP, including 
individual and collective training and mission rehearsal exercises. 
14. Marines are generally knowledgeable of what C2 system training is available at 
home-station. 
15. Marines are knowledgeable on the C2 Training Continuum. 
MATERIEL 
16. Current C2 systems adequately support current operations. 
17. There is a widespread understanding of the capabilities of C2 systems across the 
warfighting functions. 
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LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION 
18. C2 system training should be incorporated into professional military education 
(PME) programs. 
19. Unit leaders are knowledgeable about how to best employ C2 systems in an 
operational environment. 
PERSONNEL 
20. A primary MOS should be established to provide dedicated C2 system operators. 
21. C2 operator structure should be sourced from within the infantry occupational 
field. 
22. Currently, COC personnel are adequately trained to perform their assigned billet 
prior to deployment. 
23. COC staff members across the warfighting functions are assigned to a unit with 
enough time to conduct PTP with other unit members. 
FACILITIES 
24. Current combat operations center (COC) equipment adequately supports effective 
C2. 
25. Units are adequately trained to proficiently install, operate, and maintain the COC 
prior to deployment. 
Thank you for participating in this survey. 
APPENDIX C 
Email Instructions for Expert Panel 
Gentlemen: 
As you know, I am pursuing a PhD in Education through Old Dominion University. My dissertation topic 
is focused on Marine Corps C2, and all of the issues that shape the C2 training environment. I plan to 
conduct survey research to collect the data for my study. To do this, I have developed a survey based on 
topics presented in the literature, which were then tied to current Marine Corps issues across the 
DOTMLPF construct. See below for background, scope, and context. 
The purpose of this study is to identify potential barriers to the effective employment of Marine Corps 
command and control systems to enhance warfighter readiness. The scope of this study is limited to C2 
systems used by the infantry community. Recent unit After-Action Reports (AARs) and Systemic Trends 
Reports (STRs) provided by MAGTF-TC lead me to believe that we can improve upon current business 
practices across the DOTMLPF construct to better-prepare our Marines prior to deployment, even in times 
of fiscal constraint. Many people are working on several initiatives to improve the current state of C2. The 
results of this study will better-inform these efforts. 
Population 
1. Active and Reserve SNCOs and Officers up to and including Colonels within the infantry MOS 
2. SNCOs and Officers of any MOS that are now serving in an infantry unit or have recently served 
in an infantry unit 
3. SNCOs and Officers within the Division/MEB/MEF staff familiar with C2 systems used in the 
infantry community 
4. SNCOs, Officers, and Civilian Marines (GS12 - GS15) involved in the capability development, 
acquisition, and training of C2 systems from HQMC and the Supporting Establishment 
Please review my survey (attached) and make corrections or changes where appropriate to improve the 
clarity of content. This will help me achieve content and construct validity in my study. 
Thank you, 
Aaron 
Capt Aaron B. Lang, USMCR 
Doctoral Candidate 
Old Dominion University 
APPENDIX D 
Survey Participation Email to Organizational Leadership 
Marines and Civilian Leaders: 
I am a Reserve Marine nearing completion of a doctoral degree program through Old Dominion University. 
In my civilian employment, I have worked at Marine Corps Base Quantico focused on C2 system training 
for nearly five years. As I have become intimately familiar with current Marine Corps policies and 
processes to procure, implement, and train our warfighters to effectively use C2 systems in a deployed 
environment, I would like to gather your feedback as part of my doctoral dissertation. 
The purpose of this study is to identify potential barriers to the effective employment of Marine Corps 
command and control systems to enhance warfighter readiness. The scope of this study is limited to C2 
systems used by the infantry community. Recent unit After-Action Reports (AARs) and Systemic Trends 
Reports (STRs) provided by MAGTF-TC lead me to believe that we can improve upon current business 
practices across the DOTMLPF construct to better-prepare our Marines prior to deployment, even in times 
of fiscal constraint. Many people are working on several initiatives to improve the current state of C2. The 
results of this study will better-inform these efforts. 
I would like to ask you to participate in a very brief web survey to provide your thoughts on this issue. The 
target audience of this study includes the following: 
1. Active and Reserve SNCOs and Officers up to and including Colonels within the infantry MOS 
2. SNCOs and Officers of any MOS that are now serving in an infantry unit or have recently served 
in an infantry unit 
3. SNCOs and Officers within the Division/MEB/MEF staff familiar with C2 systems used in the 
infantry community 
4. SNCOs, Officers, and Civilian Marines (GS12 - GS15) involved in the capability development, 
acquisition, and training of C2 systems from HQMC and the Supporting Establishment 
In compliance with Human Subjects Protection protocol, this survey is voluntary and completely 
anonymous. Names and other Personally Identifiable Information (PII) will not be collected in this study. 
All data will be reported in aggregate to ensure that no person can be uniquely identified following survey 
completion. 
Please forward this web link to members of your organization that meet the criteria stated above. At the 
conclusion of the study, I will provide a presentation to share the results of the study with organizational 
leadership. I anticipate this being completed in April 2012. 
So you can complete the survey and participate in the study, please click on the link below to complete the 
survey regarding the effective employment of USMC C2 systems. 
<URL> 
Respectfully, 
Capt Aaron B. Lang, USMCR 
Doctoral Candidate 
Old Dominion University 
APPENDIX E 
Cover Letter to Survey Participants 
Marines: 
You are invited to participate in a brief survey addressing your perspective of the effective employment of 
Command and Control (C2) systems used in the Combat Operations Center (COC) of the infantry 
community. Your feedback is a critical component of this study and I assure you that the survey will take 
you no more than five minutes to complete. 
The purpose of this study is to identify potential barriers to the effective employment of Marine Corps 
command and control systems to enhance warfighter readiness. The scope of this study is limited to C2 
systems used by the infantry community. Recent unit After-Action Reports (AARs) and Systemic Trends 
Reports (STRs) provided by MAGTF-TC lead me to believe that we can improve upon current business 
practices across the DOTMLPF construct to better-prepare our Marines prior to deployment, even in times 
of fiscal constraint. Many people are working on several initiatives to improve the current state of C2. The 
results of this study will better-inform these efforts. 
In compliance with Human Subjects Protection protocol, this survey is voluntary and completely 
anonymous. Names and other Personally Identifiable Information (PII) will not be collected in this study. 
All data will be reported in aggregate to ensure that no person can be uniquely identified following survey 
completion. 
At the conclusion of the study, I will provide a presentation to share the results of the study with your 
organizational leadership. I anticipate this being completed in April 2012. 
Your time is greatly appreciated. 
Please click on the link below to complete the survey regarding the effective employment of USMC C2 
systems. 
<URL> 
Respectfully, 
Capt Aaron B. Lang, USMCR 
Doctoral Candidate 
Old Dominion University 
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